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My doctoral dissertation consists of three essays in the field of Industrial
Organization. The first two consider exclusive dealing contracts between up-
stream and downstream firms theoretically, while the third measures consumer
substitution among geographically differentiated air travel products empiri-
cally.
In the first chapter I study the ability of an incumbent seller to use exclu-
sive dealing contracts to foreclose efficient entry when there are n downstream
buyers, where n can be viewed as a measure of the degree of downstream com-
petition. The effect of downstream competition on the ability of the upstream
incumbent to use exclusive contracts anticompetitively depends on whether
upstream firms compete over linear or two-part prices. The model also high-
lights an interesting effect of the sunk cost of upstream entry that is ignored
in models with exactly two buyers.
In the second chapter I investigate the ability of an incumbent monopo-
list to exclude a potential entrant via exclusive dealing contracts when these
contracts include an agreement over price. I find that a simple entry game
yields both exclusionary and entry equilibria. The exclusionary equilibrium
is unique, however, under most reasonable assumptions; for example if buyers
are downstream competitors, if entry or the marginal cost of the potential
entrant are uncertain, or if the incumbent can commit not to compete for
unsigned buyers. When buyers compete with one another downstream, the
optimal guaranteed price is above (below) the marginal cost of the incumbent
when downstream buyers compete over strategic complements (substitutes).
In the third and final chapter (co-authored with Kyle Buika) I study the
question of geographic market definition in the US airline industry. Though
an accurate definition of an economic market is important for any study of
industry, there is no rule governing what exactly constitutes a market. To
define a market we must ask the question “between which products do con-
sumers substitute,” knowing that the answer to this question will depend on
how “close” products are to one another in product space, as well as how close
they are to one another, and to consumers, in geographic space. We estimate a
discrete choice model of air travel demand that uses known information about
the locations of products and consumers, which allows us to study substitu-
tion patterns among air travel products at different airports. We evaluate the
commonly used city-pair and airport-pair definitions of a market for air travel,
and conclude that a city-pair is the appropriate definition. We also employ
the Hypothetical Monopolist test for antitrust market definition, as defined
by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, and conclude
that the relevant geographic market for antitrust analysis is, according to this
test, frequently more narrowly defined as an airport-pair. Finally we conduct
merger simulations under different market definitions and compare the results
to those obtained using our own results, and conclude that accounting for
geography is important when studying mergers.
Acknowledgements
I never would have made it to graduate school without the love and support of
my mother Rosemaire Gail Keith and my father Craig Fix. This achievement
belongs to them as much as it does to me. I am grateful to my dissertation
committee of Frank Gollop, Hideo Konishi and Andrew Beauchamp, for their
wisdom and their willingness to share it with me. Good advising is a key
component to writing a dissertation (and getting a job) and I feel that mine
could not have been better. I have too many wonderful and supportive friends
and classmates to name, but I owe a debt of gratitude to Samson Alva, my
roommate, friend, tutor and informal adviser for all five years of graduate
school. I honestly could not have done this without him.
i
Contents
1 Exclusive Dealing with n downstream competitors 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Results and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.A Chaper 1 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.B Chaper 1 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Exclusive dealing contracts with price agreements 16
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 The basic model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 The incumbent’s decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.1 The baseline case: no downstream competition . . . . . 26
2.4.2 Downstream competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.3 Uncertain entry or entrant marginal cost and a commit-
ment not to compete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.A Chaper 2 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
ii
2.A.1 Strategic complements: Bertrand competition . . . . . 41
2.A.2 Strategic substitutes: Cournot competition . . . . . . . 43
2.B Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3 Geographic Market Definition in the US Airline Industry 48
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 Geographic market definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 A model of air travel demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3.1 Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3.2 Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3.3 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3.4 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4 Data and sample selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4.1 Sample selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.2 Construction of the data set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.6 Market Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6.1 Antitrust Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6.2 Economic Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.7 Merger Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.A Chapter 3 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.A.1 Sample selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.A.2 Full model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.A.3 Airport pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.A.4 City pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
iii
Chapter 1
Exclusive Dealing with n
downstream competitors
1.1 Introduction
Recent game-theoretic models have studied equilibrium incentives of two com-
peting buyers to sign exclusive dealing contracts with a monopolist seller that
may foreclose an efficient upstream entrant. Fumagalli and Motta (2006)
(henceforth FM) conclude that vigorous downstream competition makes it
impossible for an incumbent seller to use exclusive contracts to exclude a rival
entrant, while exclusion may be possible if buyers are independent monop-
olists. Abito and Wright (2008) (henceforth AW), as well as Simpson and
Wickelgren (2007), conclude that when buyers do not compete, an upstream
incumbent cannot use exclusive contracts to exclude an efficient entrant in
the absence of economies of scale, unless buyers compete aggressively down-
stream. FM and AW each study different types of upstream price competition
(linear pricing and two-part tariffs) and contract offers (contracts may be of-
fered simultaneously or sequentially, and sellers may or may not be allowed to
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discriminate in the transfer payment offered to each buyer). Their respective
conclusions regarding the effect of downstream competition on the potential
for exclusion are unchanged as a result of these model variations.
This divergence in results suggests that the manner in which downstream
competition is modeled has implications for the effect of downstream compe-
tition on the anticompetitive potential of exclusive contracts. Moreover, as
I show below, models with exactly two buyers ignore important effects that
downstream competition can have on incentives for upstream and downstream
firms, respectively, to offer and sign exclusive dealing contracts.
I employ a simple model of downstream behavior: Cournot competition
between n downstream firms. Cournot competition is a natural choice because
it provides a simple way to measure downstream competition, the number of
firms, and thus does not restrict this number to be exactly two. I find that the
effect of downstream competition on the ability of an upstream incumbent to
exclude depends on the manner in which the wholesale good is priced. When
pricing is linear, downstream competition facilitates exclusion only if the entry
cost is sufficiently high. The sunk cost of upstream entry plays a richer role
than in other models, decreasing the attractiveness of buying from the entrant
and thus lowering the transfer payments required by buyers in exchange for
exclusivity. When upstream firms compete over two-part tariffs, downstream
competition can prevent exclusion. The presence of more than two downstream
buyers plays a central role, and provides some qualification to the very strong
result of AW that an incumbent monopolist can always prevent entry of a
potential rival by offering exclusive contracts and two-part tariffs.1
1Kitamura (2010) offers a qualification of his own: that an incumbent may be threatened
by more than one efficient entrant, and that the competition between these entrants can
make it impossible for the incumbent to exclude. He assumes a zero sunk entry cost (or
equivalently, the existence of several firms that have already paid the sunk entry cost but
have not produced or sold anything), a feature not shared by previous models of exclusive
dealing and entry.
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1.2 The Model
Two manufacturers, an upstream incumbent (I) and a potential entrant (E),
produce a homogeneous good and compete over wholesale prices wI and wE.
Upstream variable costs are 0 = cE < cI = c so that the potential entrant is
more efficient. I assume that the per unit cost for the incumbent is low enough
that, with linear upstream pricing, E will not choose wE < c conditional
on entry.2 The final good is sold by n identical downstream retailers which
compete over quantities. Their only cost is the wholesale price, set by I or E,
that they pay for the good. Downstream inverse demand is given by p = 1−Q,
where Q = q1 + q2 + ...+ qn is the sum of the individual quantities sold by each
retailer. In addition to the variable cost cE which I have normalized to zero,
E must also pay a sunk cost of entry F , which I has already paid.
In the first stage of the game I can make an offer of payment x to the
downstream firms in exchange for exclusivity. Once signed, these contracts
cannot be broken.3 Buyers decide whether to accept or reject the offer, and are
assumed to accept when they are indifferent between accepting or rejecting. In
the second stage E observes the number of free buyers k, and decides whether
or not to pay the fixed cost F in order to enter the market.
In the third stage the incumbent and (potentially) the entrant set wholesale
prices in order to attract free buyers. I assume that the incumbent can dis-
criminate between free buyers and signed buyers in the wholesale price. Thus,
when upstream firms offer linear prices, the wholesale price to free buyers will
be competed down to cI while the wholesale price to signed buyers will be
that price which maximizes I’s profits, and the incumbent and the buyers an-
2This is a fairly benign assumption, only slightly more restrictive than assuming that
the entrant’s innovation is non-drastic ( c < 1/2). For example, c < .4 is sufficient for any
number of downstream firms between two and ten thousand.
3See Simpson & Wickelgren (2007) for a discussion of exclusive contracts that can be
breached by buyers if they pay expectation damages.
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ticipate this when making choices over contracts in the first stage.45 I assume
that free buyers are served by E at wholesale price wE = c, as E could afford
to offer a slightly lower price (a penny lower for example) while I could not.
In the fourth and final stage, downstream firms buy at prices agreed to and
compete over quantities. Profits are realized and any transfers agreed upon in
the first stage of the game occur.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game will depend on the num-
ber of buyers (retailers), the type of wholesale pricing, and the fixed cost of
upstream entry. Rather than exactly characterizing the equilibrium, I will
be interested in the conditions under which exclusion does or does not occur.
Specifically, I will look for coalition-proof equilibria, as defined by Bernheim,
Peleg & Whinston (1987)6. If F is large enough that E will not enter unless
there is more than one free downstream buyer, there will always be a trivial
Nash equilibrium in which all buyers sign in the first stage due to a failure to
coordinate on the more desirable equilibrium. By ignoring this possibility, I
concentrate on a much more interesting role played by the sunk entry cost.
1.3 Results and discussion
In order to analyze the play of the game it is necessary to start with the
downstream market. In the fourth stage each retailer j solves
4A mathematically equivalent assumption in the present context would be that wholesale
price offers to downstream firms are perfectly observable (for example, a signed buyer could
observe the offer made to a free buyer). Changing this assumption so that offers are not
observable does not qualitatively affect the results.
5Wholesale price will be competed down to, but not below, cI because of the previous
assumption that cI is not so high that E would choose to charge a wE even lower.
6An equilibrium is coalition-proof in the sense defined by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston
if it survives communication (without commitment) between players. If a coaliton of players
can agree on an equilibrium that is strictly better for all of them, we should expect them to
arrive at this equilibrium if they can communicate.
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max
qj
pij = qj(1−
n∑
i=1
qi − wj) (1.1)
where wj denotes the input price paid by retailer j which can take one of two
values, wI or wE. The solution to the n first order conditions resulting from
(1.1) yield the quantity demanded by k free and n − k signed downstream
buyers:
qs =
1 + (n− k)wI + kwE − (n+ 1)wI
n+ 1
, (1.2)
qf =
1 + (n− k)wI + kwE − (n+ 1)wE
n+ 1
. (1.3)
These are the demand functions faced by I and E when they are choosing
input prices.
When I and E compete over linear prices, I solves
max
wI
piI = q
s(n− k)(wI − c) (1.4)
while E will see wE competed down to c. Solving (1.4) for wI yields profits
for signed and unsigned buyers, I and E respectively:
pisR|n,k =
(1− c)2
4(n+ 1)2
, pifR|n,k =
(n+ k + 2)2(1− c)2
4(k + 1)2(n+ 1)2
,
piI|n,k =
(n− k)(1− c)2
4(k + 1)(n+ 1)
, piE|n,k =
k(n+ k + 2)(1− c)c
2(k + 1)(n+ 1)
.
If F is sufficiently small that E will enter even if only one buyer remains free
in stage 2, then I must offer each buyer x = pifR|n,1 − pisR|n in order to exclude.
Of course, F may be large enough that E requires two or more free buyers
to enter (and this number may depend on n). In the former case it will be
impossible for I to exclude, whereas in the latter case the fixed cost at which
I is just able to exclude will be decreasing in n. These results are summarized
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in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: When upstream firms set linear prices and F is small enough
that E will enter if there is only one free buyer, there are only entry equilibria.
When F is such that entry occurs only if there is more than one free buyer, the
fixed cost at which I can profitably exclude is decreasing in n. That is, intense
downstream competition facilitates anticompetitive exclusion.
Proof: First, assume F is small. In order to exclude, I must promise n
payments of pifR|n,1 − pisR|n,0 in the first stage. By selling to n buyers at the
monopoly price, I earns piI|n,0. I can afford these payments if and only if
n(1− c)2
4(n+ 1)
> n
(
(n+ 3)2(1− c)2
16(n+ 1)2
− (1− c)
2
4(n+ 1)2
)
.
The reader can verify that this inequality can be reduced to 4(n+2) > (n+3)2
and cannot be satisfied for any n.
If E requires m ≥ 2 buyers in order to enter, then pifR|n,m − pisR|n,0 is the
payment that a downstream buyer would need to sign the contract. I can
afford to make n such payments as long as piI|n,0 > n(pi
f
R|n,m − pisR|n,0), or
n(1− c)2
4(n+ 1)
> n(
(n+m+ 2)2(1− c)2
4(m+ 1)2(n+ 1)2
− (1− c)
2
4(n+ 1)2
)
This can be reduced to m ≥ √n+ 2. With √n+ 2 free buyers, E earns
piE|n,√n+2 =
n+ 2
2(n+ 1)
This is the maximum fixed cost at which E could enter (E would just
earn zero profits). Denote this marginal fixed cost as Fˆ , where if F < Fˆ the
entrant will enter and when F > Fˆ the entrant will not. Ignoring the integer
problem and taking the derivative of this marginal fixed cost with respect to
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n, ∂Fˆ
∂n
= −1
2(n+1)2
. So as the degree of downstream competition increases, the
fixed cost at which exclusion is feasible is decreasing. 
So vigorous downstream competition facilitates exclusion when upstream
firms set linear prices as in the AW model. However, exclusion is impossible
without sufficient economies of scale, as in the FM model. (Graphical illus-
trations of both of these conclusions can be seen in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 in the
chapter appendix 1.B.) Unlike that model, however, the role of the fixed entry
cost is not to create a coordination problem among buyers. Instead, receiv-
ing a cost advantage by buying from a more efficient entrant is less attractive
when it is shared with at least one rival. If downstream margins are thin when
retailers are buying from I, they will be thin when retailers are buying from
E as well. Downstream firms may prefer to receive the fixed payment from I
when the sunk cost of entry guarantees that any reduction in retailer marginal
costs must be shared.
If I is allowed to make sequential and discriminatory exclusive offers to
buyers in stage 1, exclusion becomes possible even with a small entry cost for
sufficiently high n, and I can always afford to sign n − 1 buyers if F is such
that doing so will prevent entry.
Proposition 2: When I makes sequential and discriminatory offers, there
are only exclusion equilibria for n ≥ 11. When there is a fixed cost of entry F ,
the level of this fixed cost above which exclusion is feasible is decreasing in n.
The formal proof is in the chapter appendix 1.A, while a graphical depiction
of the proof is in the chapter appendix 1.B (Figure 1.3). The sunk cost of entry
plays the same pivotal role, decreasing the payments x that I must make due
to the fact that being one of two retailers with a lower marginal cost is not as
attractive as being the only one.
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In many industries, upstream firms employ non-linear pricing in order to
solve the double-marginalization problem that comes with multiple layers of
imperfect competition. When I and E compete over two-part tariffs, they
maximize integrated profits as if they were Cournot firms with constant vari-
able costs c and 0 respectively. I will charge wI =
(n−k)(1+c)−1+2c
3(n−k) to signed
buyers while offering a linear price of c and a fixed fee of 0 to free buyers. E
offers wE =
(k−1)(1+c)
3k
to free buyers, with a fixed fee that leaves the buyer
with the same payoff it would earn by accepting I’s offer. Free buyers are
served by E by assumption, and these linear prices induce free and signed
buyers to produce qf = 1+c
3k
and qs = 1−2c
3(n−k) respectively. Thus, n − k signed
buyers combine to sell a quantity of 1−2c
3
while k free buyers combine to sell a
quantity of 1+c
3k
.
This restriction of output is important, as it means that the payoff to a
lone free buyer does not decrease with n. Because this payoff is so great, I
cannot afford to compensate many buyers for exclusivity. When the number
of buyers is small I can prevent entry, but when the number of buyers is larger
I either cannot, will not, or both.
Proposition 3: When upstream firms set two-part tariffs and F is small
enough that E will enter if there is only one free buyer, there are only exclu-
sionary equilibria for n ≤ 3, and only entry equilibria for n ≥ 4. When F is
such that entry occurs only if there is more than one free buyer, the fixed cost
at which I can exclude is increasing in n.
Proof: If some buyers reject the exclusive contract offer so that E enters in
stage 2, the best offer that I can make in stage 3 is a linear price and fixed fee
of (c, 0). If k free buyers obtain the input at c, then I will optimally calculate
wI in order to maximize
∏
I = piI|n,k + (n− k)pisR|n,k. The wI that maximizes
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∏
I is
wI =
n− 2k − 1 + ((n− k)2k + (n+ 1))c
2(n− k)(k + 1) .
This wI will induce signed buyers to produce exactly qs =
(1−c)2
2(n−k)2 , so that
the quantity produced by all signed buyers is exactly that produced by a
monopolist or Stackelberg leader with cost c. Free retailer profits in stage 4
(gross of transfers x) when I sells to n − k signed buyers at wholesale price
wI and k buyers receive the good at wholesale price c, provided n 6= k, are
pifR|n,k =
(1−c)2
4(k+1)2
. This quantity does not decrease in n.
In stage 3, this is the final payoff that E will offer to a free buyer. So
in the first stage, I must offer x = (1−c)
2
4(m+1)2
to each buyer, where m ≥ 1 is
the number of free buyers that E requires in order to enter. Then in stage
2, I offers the two-part tariff that induces exactly the monopoly surplus, and
appropriates all of it via the fixed fee. So I can afford to exclude as long as
(1−c)2
4
≥ n (1−c)2
4(m+1)2
, or m ≥ √n− 1. If m = 1, so that E enters as long as there
is at least one free buyer, then this means that I can afford to exclude only
when n ≤ 4. However, when n = 4, I earns a net payoff of zero from doing so.
I will thus make an offer of x = (1−c)
2
64
, which will induce exactly one buyer to
sign the contract, earning I a positive payoff of (1−2c)
2
9
− (1−c)2
100
. I prefers to
exclude when n ≤ 3.
If m > 1, then it must be that F = (1+c)
2
9
− m (1−c)2
4(m+1)2
for some m > 1.
So the Fˆ at which I can just exclude is Fˆ = (1+c)
2
9
− (√n − 1) (1−c)2
4(
√
n)2
=
(1+c)2
9
+ (1−c)
2
4
( 1
n
− 1√
n
). Ignoring the integer problem and taking the derivative
with respect to n, ∂Fˆ
∂n
= (1−c)
2
4n
( 1
2
√
n
− 1
n
), which is positive when n ≥ 4.
I will choose to exclude when (1−c)
2
4
−n (1−c)2
4(m+1)2
≥ (1−2c)2
9
− (1−c)2
(n+1)2
. This will
also happen less frequently as n becomes large, as I’s payoff from exclusion
(the left hand side) is decreasing in n, while I’s payoff from only signing one
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buyer is increasing in n. 
So a two-part tariff-setting upstream monopolist cannot, or will not choose
to, prevent entry by signing downstream buyers to exclusive contracts when
downstream competition is vigorous. This result does not depend on the
model of downstream competition per se, but occurs because there may be
more than a small number of downstream buyers. AW’s result that exclusion
should always occur in the case of a downstream duopoly follows directly
from the idea that monopoly profits must be more than twice duopoly profits.
By the same token, if monopoly profits are not three or four times those of
individual duopolists, then the incumbent will not be able to exclude when
there are three or four downstream buyers.
1.4 Conclusion
The potential for upstream firms to use exclusive dealing contracts anticom-
petitively depends on the nature of downstream competition. When compe-
tition is vigorous, retailer profits are small and the contract payment may be
relatively attractive. On the other hand, competition creates incentives for
retailers to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals, forcing an upstream
incumbent to compensate downstream buyers dearly for exclusivity. A high
fixed cost of entry mitigates the latter effect by lowering the payments that the
incumbent firm must make. Vertical arrangements such as two-part pricing
exacerbate the latter effect by ensuring that a single buyer that does not sign
an exclusive deal can compete as a duopolist against the vertically restricted
signed buyers. These two effects are easily ignored in models with only two
buyers.
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1.A Chaper 1 Appendix
This appendix contains a proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: When I makes sequential and discriminatory offers, there
are only exclusion equilibria for n ≥ 11. When there is a fixed cost of entry F ,
the level of this fixed cost above which exclusion is feasible is decreasing in n.
Exclusion is always possible and profitable (I’s final payoff after the trans-
fers x is positive) if
n(1− c)2
4(n+ 1)
>
n∑
k=1
(
n+ k + 22(1− c)2
4(k + 1)2(n+ 1)2
− (1− c)
2
4(n+ 1)2
)
, (1.5)
which simplifies to
n > (n+ 1)
n∑
k=1
1
(1 + k)2
+ 2
n∑
k=1
1
k + 1
. (1.6)
The right-hand side of the expression is not simple to evaluate. The two
terms are a truncated zeta function and a truncated harmonic series. I proceed
by induction. I first verify that the expression holds when n = 11 (a simple
calculation shows that the right side is 10.9864) and I assume that it holds for
n− 1 > 11, or that
n− 1 > n
n−1∑
k=1
1
(k + 1)2
+ 2
n∑
k=1
1
k + 1
.
Using this assumption, 1.A.2 (and thus 1.A.1) holds as long as 1 > 3
n+1
+∑n−1
k=1
1
(1+k)2
. It is easily verified that this is true when n ≥ 11. So entry is
prevented when there are many buyers, regardless of any fixed cost of entry.
Additionally, I can always afford to sign n−1 buyers when doing so prevents
entry as long as piI|n,0 >
∑n
k=2(pi
f
R|n,k − pisR|n,n), or
11
n(1− c)2
4(n+ 1)
>
n∑
k=2
(
(n+ k + 2)2(1− c)2
4(k + 1)2(n+ 1)2
− (1− c)
2
4(n+ 1)
)
. (1.7)
This inequality also reduces to one that is not easily simplified:
n > (n+ 1)
n∑
k=2
1
(k + 1)2
+ 2
n∑
k=2
1
k + 1
.
It is straightforward to verify that the inequality holds for n=2. Proceeding
by induction and letting t = k + 1, the inductive assumption can be written
as
n− 1 > n
n∑
t=1
1
t2
− 5n
4
+ 2
n∑
t=1
1
t
− 3.
So, in order to show inequality 1.A.3, it is necessary to show that
1 ≥ 3
n+ 1
+
n∑
t=1
1
t2
− 5
4
.
This is true for any n ≥ 2.
Now it remains to show that piE|n,1 is decreasing in n:
∂piE|n,1
∂n
= −8
(4n+4)2
< 0.
So I can sign n− 1 buyers making sequential, discriminatory offers, so long as
doing so prevents entry. The profits that E can earn when there is only one
free buyer are decreasing in n, and thus so is the fixed cost at which E will
not enter. 
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1.B Chaper 1 Figures
Figure 1.1: The sum of payments necessary to exclude is always greater than
incumbent profits under exclusion (Proposition 1). n = 10, c = 0.3.
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Figure 1.2: The marginal fixed cost above which I can exclude is decreasing
in n (Proposition 1). c = 0.3.
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Figure 1.3: I can exclude for sufficiently high F , or for sufficiently high n
(Proposition 2). c = 0.3.
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Chapter 2
Exclusive dealing contracts with
price agreements
2.1 Introduction
Exclusive dealing contracts between upstream and downstream firms have long
been the target of antitrust scrutiny, legislative action and debate between aca-
demic scholars from the legal and economic professions. While a promise not
to trade with a firm’s rivals may seem obviously anticompetitive, economists
long struggled to explain exactly how an incumbent monopolist could use ex-
clusionary vertical contracts to exclude a potential entrant. Moreover, there
are efficiency justifications for such contracts.1
The difficulty in explaining the use of the contracts as an exclusionary
device comes from the observation that buyers will only actually sign the
contracts if doing so is in their best interest. If a buyer signs a contract with
a monopolist that excludes another potential supplier of the same good, then
1See Marvel (1982), Besanko and Perry (1993), Bernheim and Whinston (1998), and
Segal and Whinston (2000b) for such “efficiency” arguments. The idea, in its most basic
form, is that an exclusive contract can correct a market failure by protecting investments
made between parties from a free-rider problem.
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that buyer must be compensated by the monopolist to the tune of the difference
between buyer surplus under competition and under monopoly. But because
monopoly pricing involves deadweight loss, the amount the buyer requires to
be just willing to sign the contract is more than the most that the monopolist
would be willing to pay. The incumbent monopolist will not be willing to make
an offer that a buyer would accept unless the contract actually creates some
surplus, for example by aligning incentives of buyer and seller and allowing for
some mutually beneficial investment to be made.
This is the “triangle-loss” argument put forth by Chicago school legal schol-
ars Director and Levi (1956), Posner (1976) and Bork (1978). It is powerful
in its simplicity: the very existence of exclusive agreements implies that they
are welfare-enhancing. Nevertheless, several authors have offered variations
on a simple entry model that suggest otherwise; under realistic assumptions
exclusive dealing contracts can be used to deter efficient entry, a restriction of
competition that can lead to a loss in total surplus.
Aghion and Bolton (1987) show that exclusive contracts can be profitable,
although not necessarily exclusionary, if the marginal cost of the entrant is
not known ex ante, and a buyer and seller can first agree on a transaction, a
price and a payment for breach of contract. Ramseyer, Rasmusen and Wiley
(1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000a) show that economies of scale can lead
to exclusionary equilibria in a simple entry game either because the contracts
are mutually beneficial for the monopolist seller and the buyers that choose
to sign the contract, or because the seller benefits from a coordination failure
among buyers. Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) and Abito and Wright (2008)
allow buyers to compete, and find that if buyers are firms that compete with
each other downstream, then an incumbent monopolist can exclude a potential
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entrant as long as buyers compete aggressively enough.2
The type of contract modeled by the above authors is generally quite sim-
ple, typically composed only of a promise of exclusivity and a promise to pay
for that exclusivity. In reality, exclusive dealing contracts are often multidi-
mensional, including agreements on price among other variables in addition
to exclusivity. Well known examples of such contracts can be found in Stan-
dard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co. (1922), in which contracts in-
cluded agreements over wholesale price, and FTC v. Brown Shoe (1966), in
which retailers that signed exclusive franchise agreements with Brown Shoe
Co. received below list prices on some footwear, along with other benefits
that reduced their costs. More recently, a group of soft drink bottling compa-
nies sued Coca-Cola over vertical contracts with retailers in the southwestern
United States that included price breaks in exchange for severe limitations on
the sales and marketing of competing brands (Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bot-
tling Co. (2006)). These examples suggest that a more realistic picture of the
potential for exclusion can be obtained by allowing upstream and downstream
firms to sign contracts that contain agreements over price.
In this paper I present a simple model of exclusive dealing and entry in
which the incumbent seller can agree with the buyer on a linear price in addi-
tion to exclusivity and a transfer payment. I show that in a static entry game,
the ability to contract over price greatly increases the exclusionary power of
the contracts. For example, only exclusionary equilibria exist to the game
described if a potential entrant’s marginal cost, or the act of entry itself, are
2Fumagalli and Motta (2006) conclude the opposite, that when buyers compete with
each other very aggressively that this breaks any potential exclusionary equilibrium. Their
model is special, in that they only consider two different types of downstream competition
(independent monopolists and perfect Bertrand competitors) and assume a small fixed cost
of downstream participation that leads to an equilibrium in mixed strategies between buy-
ers. In two comments, Simpson and Wickelgren (2005) and Wright (2009) note that slight
changes in the assumptions lead to an opposite result.
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uncertain, if the incumbent seller can commit not to compete with a potential
entrant over a free buyer, or if buyers compete with one another downstream.
In the next section I present the model of competition and rules of the en-
try game. In Section 2.3 I discuss equilibrium play and show that the ability
to contract over price allows the incumbent monopolist to determine the entire
outcome of the game in one first-stage decision. Section 2.4 contains results
and their proofs, while Section 2.5 concludes and discusses potential implica-
tions of these findings. I include in the appendix a simple parameterization
that allows the reader to see clearly why the result for the case of downstream
competitors holds true.
2.2 The basic model
The model contains two buyers, assumed to be firms rather than final con-
sumers. They each purchase the same intermediate good from upstream firms,
and this good can be thought of as an input into production or as a good that
the firms buy and then promote and resell at a mark-up.
Let prices paid by buyer j be denoted wj, and let buyer j take some
action aj in order to maximize profits in the final goods market. Common
interpretations for aj are price or quantity choices. Higher values of aj should
be thought of as more aggressive competition; for example if buyers compete
by choosing price in the output market, an increase in aj should be thought
of as buyer j decreasing price.
While final consumers are not modeled explicitly, it is assumed that com-
petition benefits them. Thus, the consumer surplus function increases in aj.
Denote this function CS(a1, a2), with
∂CS
∂aj
> 0 for j = 1, 2.
Buyers take input prices as given and choose actions to maximize their own
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profit or surplus function. Buyer revenues rj(aj, ai) are assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave in aj, and also may
depend on the competitive action of the rival buyer. Buyer costs cj(aj, wj) are
convex in aj, and also depend on the wholesale price paid for the intermediate
good. Buyer profits are pij(wj, aj, ai) = rj(aj, ai)−cj(aj, wj). The assumptions
on the revenue and cost functions imply a unique solution to the first-order
condition defining buyer j’s best response function,
bj(ai, wj) :
∂rj
∂aj
− ∂cj
∂aj
= 0. (2.1)
The function bj(wj, ai) is assumed to be a differentiable function, with
∂bj
∂wj
<
0.3
Also a function of the competitive actions taken downstream is buyer j’s
demand for the intermediate good, qj(aj, ai). As a buyer competes more ag-
gressively it demands more of the input, so
∂qj
∂aj
> 0.4 Because wj is a linear
price, it is true that
∂cj
∂wj
= qj. If buyers are retailers that sell the intermediate
good at a markup, it will be true that qj is equal to final demand as well, but
this need not be the case.
It will be useful later to understand more deeply the relationship between
qj, buyer j’s demand function, and pij, buyer j’s profit function. Taking the
derivative of the profit function with respect to the wholesale price,
3The assumption
∂bj
∂wj
=
∂pi2j
∂aj∂wj
=
∂c2j
∂aj∂wj
< 0 is quite natural. Buyer costs are increasing
in aj because competition increases output, and total costs are increasing in output. One
reason that total costs increase in output is the per-unit cost wj , and thus total costs will
increase at a higher rate if wj is higher. Or, another way of looking at it, as costs go up
buyers choose to compete less aggressively. For example, buyers would choose to produce
and sell less, or raise price.
4Demand depends on price only through aj . An increase in wj causes the buyer to
compete less aggressively and demand less of the intermediate good. It may seem natural
that
∂qj
∂ai
< 0 but the assumption is unnecessary.
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dpij
dwj
=
dbj
dwj
(
∂rj
∂aj
− ∂cj
∂aj
)
− ∂cj
∂wj
. (2.2)
When buyer j is optimizing, (2.1) is satisfied so that
dpij
dwj
= −qj. It immediately
follows that
pij(w, bj(ai, w), ai) =
∫ w¯(ai)
w
qj(bj(ai, wj), ai)dwj, (2.3)
where w¯(ai) is the choke price which may be infinite and can depend on the
rival action ai (see figure 2.1 in appendix 2.A).
5 The reader may find this result
familiar, as the relationship is analogous to that between the demand function
and the consumer surplus (utility) function of a consumer with quasilinear
utility (Varian, 1978).
In section 2.4.1, and again in section 2.4.3, I will maintain the assumption
that the two buyers do not compete with each other (for example, they might
sell in segmented markets). If buyers do not compete, the existence of a second
buyer is superfluous and I will focus on the decision of a single buyer j. In
this case,
∂rj
∂ai
=
∂qj
∂ai
=
∂bj
∂ai
= 0, and I will drop the i subscripted arguments
from the profit, best response and demand functions of buyer j.6 If buyers
do compete, it is natural to assume that
∂rj
∂ai
=
∂pij
∂ai
< 0; competition from
rivals can only decrease revenues and profits. The sign of the derivative
∂bj
∂ai
will indicate whether buyers compete over strategic complements (e.g. prices)
or strategic substitutes (e.g. quantities). The magnitude of this derivative
must be less than one in absolute value in order for buyer best responses to
intersect.
There are two upstream firms, an incumbent monopolist I that is already
5Formally, pij(w¯(ai), bj(ai, w¯(ai)), ai) = 0 and pij(wj , bj(ai, wj), ai) > 0 ∀ wj < w¯(ai).
6So pij(wj , aj , ai), bj(ai, wj) and qj(aj , ai) become pij(wj , aj), bj(wj) and qj(aj), respec-
tively.
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active in the intermediate good market and a potential entrant E that can pay
an entry cost F in order to produce an identical product in this market. As a
monopolist, I chooses w1 and w2 to maximize variable profits
piI = (w1 − cI)q1(a1, a2) + (w2 − cI)q2(a2, a1). (2.4)
While the entrant must pay a sunk cost in order to enter the market, it has
a lower per-unit cost cE < cI than the incumbent. However, cE is not so low
that that E would choose to set a wholesale price to a free buyer below cI in
the absence of upstream competition (the entrant’s innovation is non-drastic).
I and E compete over free buyers via wholesale prices in the event of entry.
If both sellers compete over a buyer the wholesale price will be driven down
to cI , and E is assumed to serve that buyer, reflecting the idea that E would
be able to make an offer that is better by a penny which the buyer strictly
prefers.
The game proceeds in stages, with I first able to offer an exclusive contract
to each buyer which includes a transfer to be made between buyer and seller
and an agreement over the wholesale price to be paid by the exclusive buyer.
Thus, a contract is a pair (w, x), where w is the linear price and x is the
transfer payment agreed upon. These contracts are assumed to be offered
simultaneously. I follow the game-theoretic literature on exclusive dealing
and assume that if a buyer is indifferent between signing and not signing the
contract, the buyer signs. This avoids an open set problem and reflects the idea
that the buyer may face some small (possibly non-pecuniary) cost of switching
suppliers, or the idea that I may be able to make an offer that is better by a
penny which the buyer strictly prefers.7
7This assumption means that in equilibrium, I will make a contract offer that leaves a
buyer indifferent between signing and not signing, while I appropriates all the upstream
monopoly surplus. An alternative assumption, for example, would be that I and the buyers
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In the second stage E observes the decisions of the two buyers and decides
whether or not to enter. I assume that E will find it profitable to enter as
long as it can serve at least one buyer.8 However, if both buyers have signed
the contract in the first stage, competitive entry will be prevented.
In the third stage, upstream sellers offer wholesale prices to free down-
stream buyers (signed buyers are commited to the wholesale price they agreed
to in the first stage). In the fourth stage, buyers purchase the wholesale good
at the prices set in stages 1 or 3, take competitive actions downstream and
produce final output. Final payoffs, equal to profits net of any transfers agreed
to in the first stage, are awarded to all players.
This is the form of the game analyzed in section 2.3 and (most of) section
2.4. Section 2.4.3 presents extensions of the basic model under the assumption
that the two buyers do not compete with one another.
2.3 The incumbent’s decision
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is found through backwards induc-
tion. In the fourth stage, buyers compete, yielding the vector a∗(w1, w2) =
(a∗1(w1, w2), a
∗
2(w2, w1)) which is the intersection of the best responses b1(a2, w1)
and b2(a1, w2).
9 At this stage each buyer is either free, in which case he pays
a wholesale price of cI , or is bound to an exclusive contract, in which case he
pays the price offered by I. The profits of free and signed buyers, conditional
on the total number of signed and unsigned buyers, can then be expressed as
divide the surplus evenly among themselves. Such an assumption does not affect whether or
not exclusion occurs in equilibrium, only how the spoils are divided among the contracting
parties.
8Formally, F < (cI − cE)qj(bj(ai, cI), ai).
9If buyers do not compete, bj is only a function of wj . In this case it is meaningless to
talk about an “intersection” of best responses.
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functions of the wholesale prices offered by I to signed buyers:
pisj|S=2(wj, wi) = pij(wj, a
∗(wj, wi)), pisj|S=1(wj) = pij(wj, a
∗(wj, cI)),
pifj|S=1(wi) = pij(cI , a
∗(cI , wi)), pi
f
j|S=0 = pij(cI , a
∗(cI , cI)).10
Input demands qj are similarly denoted as
qsj|S=2(wj, wi) = qj(a
∗(wj, wi)), qsj|S=1(wj) = qj(a
∗(wj, cI)),
qfj|S=1(wi) = qj(a
∗(cI , wi)), q
f
j|S=0 = qj(a
∗(cI , cI)).11
The normal form of the game played by the buyers in the first stage is
then:
Buyer 1
Buyer 2
Accept Reject
Accept pis1|S=2 + x1, pi
s
2|S=2 + x2 pi
s
1|S=1 + x1, pi
f
2|S=1
Reject pif1|S=1, pi
s
2|S=1 + x2 pi
f
1|S=0, pi
f
2|S=0
In order to ensure exclusion I must choose x1 and x2 high enough to make
(Accept, Accept) the Nash equilibrium of this game. This means xj ≥ pifj|S=1−
pisj|S=2 and, in order to make (Sign, Sign) the only Nash equilibrium, xj ≥
pifj|S=0 − pisj|S=1. Throughout the paper I assume that the incumbent earns a
higher payoff by excluding than by offering an xj in between these values and
only selling to one buyer.12 In equilibrium then, I will offer xj = pi
f
j|S=1−pisj|S=2
10If buyers do not compete, pisj|S=2(wj) = pi
s
j|S=1(wj) = pij(wj , bj(wj)) and pi
f
j|S=1 =
pifj|S=0 = pij(cI , bj(cI)).
11If buyers do not compete, qsj|S=2(wj) = q
s
j|S=1(wj) = qj(wj , bj(wj)) and q
f
j|S=1 =
qfj|S=0 = qj(cI , bj(cI)).
12In a model with only two buyers this is a perfectly sensible assumption. If the incumbent
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as long as doing so yields a final payoff greater than zero, and buyers will sign
if I makes this offer.
By controlling in the first stage the wholesale price that will be paid in the
third stage, the incumbent can affect the four possible downstream payoffs and,
thus, the payment necessary to achieve exclusion. The obstacle to exclusion is
whether or not I can afford this payment, and the Chicago school argument is
that I would not be able to afford to pay the amount that buyers would require
in order to sign the contracts. Given that xj = pi
f
j|S=1 − pisj|S=2 is increasing
in wj, I may be able to lower wj below the monopoly wholesale price w
m,
producing a more managable payment xj. Figure 2.2 shows how incumbent
and buyer profits (gross of transfer payments), and hence the payment x, vary
with the wholesale price charged to signed buyers. Figure 2.3 shows a situation
in which I cannot exclude when charging the monopoly price, but can do so
when guaranteeing a lower price. (NOTE: In these figures, buyers are assumed
to be competitors).
Given that xj = pi
f
j|S=1 − pisj|S=2, the incumbent’s problem boils down to
choosing input prices w1 and w2 that maximize the positive difference between
variable profits and the payments that I must make. I’s objective function is
max
w1,w2
∏
I
= (w1−cI)qs1|S=2+(w2−cI)qs2|S=2−(pif1|S=1−pis1|S=2)−(pif2|S=1−pis2|S=2).
(2.5)
In general there will be, from I’s perspective, an optimal w1, w2 that max-
imizes his own payoff net of the payments x1, x2. In the following sections I
show that exclusionary equilibria to the game described above always exist.
Entry equilibria exist as well as long as downstream buyers do not compete,
were to allow a free buyer, that buyer would obtain the input at I’s marginal cost. I would
also have to offer a w close to cI if buyers compete aggressively. In the parameterization
offered in the appendix the assumption that exclusion is more profitable than accomodating
entry will hold.
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but these equilibria do not survive the generalizations of the basic model pre-
sented in section 2.4.3.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 The baseline case: no downstream competition
When buyers do not compete downstream,
∂bj
∂ai
=
∂qj
∂ai
=
∂pij
∂ai
= 0. Since the
choice of wj does not affect the strategic choice of buyer I, I can restrict
attention to the maximization problem
max
wj
(wj − cI)qsj|S=2 − (pifj|S=1 − pisj|S=2), (2.6)
where I have ignored the fact that there are two buyers because I’s decision
reduces to two identical maximization problems.
When buyers do not compete with each other, it is simple to show that
the only exclusionary equilibrium is quite trivial; I can exclude, but only by
offering the wholesale price wj = cI to both buyers and earning a final payoff
of zero. This result can be viewed as a corollary of the general principle that
upstream surplus is maximized when the wholesale price is equal to marginal
cost.
Proposition 1: When there is no competition between buyers, exclusion may
or may not occur in equilibrium. I is indifferent between signing 0, 1 or 2
buyers, and must offer xj = 0 and wj = cI in order to induce the buyers to
sign.
Proof: In order to exclude, the incumbent solves (2.6) twice, yielding the
first-order condition:
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(wj − cI)
∂qsj|S=2
∂aj
∂bj
∂wj
+ qsj|S=2 +
∂pisj|S=2
∂wj
+
∂pisj|S=2
∂aj
∂bj
∂wj
= 0 (2.7)
Since buyer j is optimizing,
∂pis
j|S=2
∂aj
= 0. Using also the fact that
∂pis
j|S=2
∂wj
=
−qsj|S=2, it is clear that the solution to this first-order condition is wj = cI .
The second-order condition
dqsj|S=2
dwj
+ (wj − cI)
d2qsj|S=2
dw2j
< 0
is satisfied when wj = cI , because demand is downward sloping. To see that
this is a global maximum, it is necessary to note that
∫ w¯
cI
qj(bj(t))dt−
∫ w¯
wj
qj(bj(t))dt =
∫ wj
cI
qj(bj(t))dt > (wj−cI)qj(bj(wj)) ∀wj > cI
and
∫ w¯
cI
qj(bj(t))dt−
∫ w¯
wj
qj(bj(t))dt = −
∫ cI
wj
qj(bj(t))dt > (wj−cI)qj(bj(wj)) ∀wj < cI .
See figure 2.4. 
So raising the wholesale price above cost will increase incumbent profits less
than it will increase the payment necessary to compensate a buyer for exclu-
sivity, while lowering the wholesale price below cost will decrease profits more
than it will decrease the payment. Of course, this follows directly from the
standard result that total surplus is maximized when price is equal to marginal
cost, and is directly related to the arguments of University of Chicago legal
scholars that if buyers are final consumers and there are no economies of scale,
then an incumbent monopolist cannot use exclusive contracts to prevent effi-
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cient entry (the buyers will not sign the contracts for a fee that the incumbent
is willing to pay).
The wrinkle now is that, when the contracts can include an ex ante agree-
ment over price, an incumbent monopolist can use exclusive contracts to pre-
vent efficient entry, but can no longer extract monopoly rents from customers.
In equilibrium, I may offer a contract of (0, cI) to both buyers, one buyer,
or neither. By assumption, the buyers will sign this contract if it is offered,
so in equilibrium S may equal 0, 1 or 2. Efficient entry may or may not be
prevented in this case.
While I may earn the same payoff whether or not exclusion occurs, it is
worth noting that society does not. Buyers receive the input at cI , and thus
take the same competitive actions downstream, whether or not they sign the
contract. Thus, final consumer surplus CS(a1, a2) is the same under exclusion
or entry. On the other hand, upstream surplus is equal to 0 when S = 2,
(cI − cE)qj − F when S = 1 and 2(cI − cE)qj − F when S = 0. Since 2(cI −
cE)qj −F > (cI − cE)qj −F > 0, it is obvious that the exclusive contracts are
socially wasteful.
As noted already, the result that an incumbent monopolist cannot earn
a positive profit by excluding, even using price guarantees, in the presence
of certain efficient entry should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar
with the idea of economic surplus. When price is above marginal cost, there
is deadweight loss. An upstream firm cannot make its customers sign an
exclusive contract without compensating them fully for their loss in surplus.
Moving from a competitive price to a price above marginal cost, the increase
in upstream surplus is less than the decrease in downstream surplus by the
amount of the deadweight loss.
The result in Proposition 1 is theoretically interesting, but provides no
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guidance as to how to select between the multiple equilibria that exist in the
model. However, I will show in the following sections that slight and realistic
extensions of this basic model eliminate the possibility of any entry equilibria
of this simple game. Only exclusionary equilibria remain.
2.4.2 Downstream competition
In this section I relax the assumption that buyers do not compete with one
another downstream. When buyers compete, they care not only about the
price they pay, but the price their rival pays as well. Thus, I does not solve two
independent maximization problems. Rather, in setting wj, I must take into
account not only a signed buyer’s choice of aj, but the hypothetical response
of a free buyer ai, and how this in turn affects both the profits of downstream
buyers and the quantity purchased by a signed buyer.
It has been shown that when buyers compete with each other, the incum-
bent may be able to exclude a more efficient potential entrant via exclusive
contracts even in the absence of price guarantees, provided that the degree of
downstream competition is sufficiently high (Abito and Wright, 2008). This is
because when downstream profits are low, the payment x becomes relatively
more attractive and I is able to exclude, even though buyers rationally antic-
ipate that I will set the monopoly input price in the third stage of the game.
However, when buyers do not compete too aggressively, I cannot exclude un-
less the fixed cost of entry F is high enough.
When contracts include price guarantees, I can make an offer of xj = 0 and
wj = cI to both buyers when they compete with each other just as easily as
when they do not (and both will accept the contract offer by assumption). The
incumbent will earn a payoff of zero after making such an offer. The difference
is that now, in solving (2.5), the wholesale prices that I chooses to set will
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depend on buyer best response functions. As Proposition 2 shows, there will
always be a combination of wholesale prices and one-time payments that yields
I a payoff that is strictly greater than zero, and which leads to exclusion
in equilibrium. The actual level of this price, particularly the relationship
between the wholesale price and I’s marginal cost, will depend on whether
buyers compete over strategic substitutes or complements.
Proposition 2: When buyers compete, exclusion always occurs in equilib-
rium. If buyers compete over strategic complements (substitutes) the optimal
input price is above (below) I’s marginal cost cI .
Proof: Now the incumbent’s final payoff function is given by (2.5). Consider
the hypothetical wholesale price of w1 = w2 = cI that the incumbent chose
when buyers did not compete with each other, noting that
∏
I(cI , cI) = 0,
and imagine a slight increase in the wj that is guaranteed. The question is
whether this would increase or decrease the final payoff of the incumbent or,
put another way, would it have a greater effect on the profits of the incumbent
or on the payment xj that the incumbent would have to make in order to
induce the buyer to sign the contract in the first stage? Taking the total
derivative of this function with respect to wj around the point (cI , cI),
d
∏
I
dwj
= qsj|S=2 + (wj − cI)
(
∂qs
j|S=2
∂aj
dbj
dwj
+
∂qs
j|S=2
∂ai
∂bi
∂aj
dbj
dwj
)
+(wi − cI)
(
∂qs
i|S=2
∂aj
dbj
dwj
+
∂qs
i|S=2
∂ai
∂bi
∂aj
dbj
dwj
)
+
∂pis
j|S=2
∂wj
+
∂pis
j|S=2
∂aj
dbj
dwj
+
∂pis
j|S=2
∂ai
∂bi
∂aj
dbj
dwj
−
(
∂pif
i|S=1
∂aj
dbj
dwj
+
∂pif
i|S=1
∂ai
∂bi
∂aj
dbj
dwj
)
+
(
∂pis
i|S=2
∂aj
dbj
dwj
+
∂pis
i|S=2
∂ai
∂bi
∂aj
dbj
dwj
)
.
First, note that wj = wi = cI at the point of the total derivative, and the
identity pisi|S=2(cI , wj) ≡ pifi|S=1(wj). These terms cancel, leaving
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d
∏
I
dwj
= qsj|S=2 +
∂pis
j|S=2
∂wj
+
∂pis
j|S=2
∂aj
dbj
dwj
+
∂pis
j|S=2
∂ai
∂bi
∂aj
dbj
dwj
.
Using also the facts that
∂pis
j|S=2
∂aj
= 0 and
∂pis
j|S=2
∂wj
= −qsj|S=2, it is apparent
that one term entirely summarizes how the incumbent’s final payoff is affected
by a slight change in wj around cI when wi = cI :
d
∏
I
=
∂pisj|S=2
∂ai
∂bi
∂aj
dbj
dwj
dwj.
If ∂bi
∂aj
> 0 (the actions are strategic complements) then this term is positive,
and a slight change above cost will yield a positive final payoff for the in-
cumbent. If ∂bi
∂aj
< 0 (the actions are strategic substitutes), then this term is
negative, and a slight change below cost will yield a positive final payoff for
the incumbent.13 Solving for the exact values of w1 and w2 will be possible in
a parameterized model. What is important is that the incumbent can increase
its payoff above zero by charging a wholesale price that is either above or below
cost. Because the incumbent earns a payoff of zero by not signing the buyers,
the incumbent strictly prefers to make an offer that the buyers will sign in the
first stage of the game. Thus, exclusion occurs in equilibrium. 
So when I can offer price guarantees, exclusion occurs in the unique sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium. To compare this to the results of Abito and
Wright (2008) and Simpson and Wickelgren (2007), the price guarantees lead
to exclusion for any degree of downstream competition, not just downstream
competition that is particularly fierce. All that is necessary to generate this
result is that the strategic choices of one buyer affect the final payoff of the
other.
While exactly characterizing the exclusionary guaranteed price requires
13The other two derivatives in that expression are negative:
∂pisj|S=2
∂ai
< 0 by assumption,
and
dbj
dwj
=
∂bj
∂wj
/(1− ∂bj∂ai ∂bi∂aj ) < 0.
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some parameterization of downstream competition, it is possible to place an
upper bound on this price. In particular this upper bound is w1 = w2 = w
int,
where wint is the symmetric solution to
max
w1,w2
(w1 − cI)qs1|S=2 + (w2 − cI)qs2|S=2 + pis1|S=2 + pis2|S=2. (2.8)
This result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3: When buyers compete and the incumbent can guarantee
wholesale prices in the exclusive contract, the optimal wholesale price will al-
ways be less than the one which maximizes integrated producer surplus.
Proof: The wholesale price that maximizes integrated producer surplus is the
solution to (2.8), and must satisfy the following first order conditions:
qsj|S=2+(wj−cI)
dqsj|S=2
dwj
+(wi−cI)
dqsi|S=2
dwj
+
dpisj|S=2
dwj
+
dpisi|S=2
dwj
= 0, j, i = 1, 2, j 6= i
(2.9)
These two equations have a symmetric solution w1 = w2 = w
int where wint
is the wholesale price that maximizes integrated surplus.
In the face of entry, I does not solve this exact problem, but instead solves
(2.5). The difference between (2.8) and (2.5) is the subtraction of the profits
of the free buyers. So
∏
I(w
int, wint) may be positive or negative, but it is
certainly less than (2.8) evaluated at wint. Moreover, the derivative of
∏
I
with respect to w1 and w2, evaluated at w1 = w2 = w
int is negative. The
derivative of (2.5) with respect to wj is
qsj|S=2 + (wj − cI)
dqsj|S=2
dwj
+ (wi − cI)
dqsi|S=2
dwj
+
dpisj|S=2
dwj
+
dpisi|S=2
dwj
−
dpifi|S=2
dwj
.
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When I sets w1 = w2 = w
int satisfying (2.9), this derivative is
d
∏
i
dwj
= −
dpifi|S=2
dwj
< 0.
Given that the derivative of the objective function is negative at this point,
a small decrease in wj would raise I’s final payoff. So the optimal w is lower
than wint, the wholesale price that yields the integrated monopoly surplus. 
It is worth noting that wint < wmI . When buyers do not compete, w
int will
be equal to cI , while when buyers compete aggressively, w
int will be close to
I’s monopoly price.
2.4.3 Uncertain entry or entrant marginal cost and a
commitment not to compete
In the version of the game described in 2.4.1, the transfer xj was equal to zero
for each buyer j even when that buyer agreed to sign the exclusive contract.
The reason is that pifj|S=1 = pi
s
j|S=2(cI): a signed buyer earns exactly as much
as a free buyer in the output market when the two buyers receive the same
input price of cI . It follows that an extension of the model in which a free
buyer earns less than pifj|S=1, at least in expectation, would allow I to pay a
negative xj in combination with the guaranteed offer of wj = cI (meaning that
buyers would make a transfer payment to the incumbent for the guaranteed
price of cI).
14
In this section I discuss three such extensions. The first is uncertain entry,
which may be a more realistic assumption than entry that occurs with prob-
ability one. One reason entry could be uncertain is that a potential entrant
may be faced with many possibly profitable investments. In this case, whether
14A useful way to think about such a contract is a 2-part tariff that is agreed upon at the
time the exclusive contract is signed.
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entry occurs or not would depend on the opportunity cost of entry, or what
other investment the entrant could make instead of entering this particular
industry.
In the second extension the entrant’s marginal cost of production is ex ante
uncertain. It is common in models of industrial organization and international
trade to assume that entrants do not know their marginal cost until after they
have (at least partially) entered an industry. Once again, such an assumption
is more realistic in many scenarios than the baseline case analyzed above.
Finally, I also allow for the possibility that the incumbent can commit
not to sell to buyers that do not sign the exclusive deals (for example, by
writing a contract that guarantees to an exclusive buyer that I will not sell to
multiline dealers). There is a long history of such refusals to deal, and they
have frequently incurred legal action under US Antitrust laws as conspiracies
in restraint of trade.15 I will denote the price that E charges in the absence of
this competition from I as wmE , where w
m
E > cI by assumption.
Introducing uncertainty into the model requires the assumption that down-
stream buyers maximize expected surplus. This assumption makes exclusion
more difficult for the incumbent when compared to the alternative assumption
that buyers may be risk averse. In order to simplify the analysis I will main-
tain the assumption that buyers do not compete.16 Thus, I will continue to
focus on the decision of a generic buyer j.
I model uncertain entry as a probability ρ < 1 that E enters in the second
stage of the game if there is a free buyer. When ρ < 1 buyer j does not
expect to earn pifj|S=1 by rejecting the exclusive contract; the expected payoff
is ρpifj|S=1 + (1− ρ)pij(wm, bj(wm)).
15A well known example is Lorain Journal Co. v. United States (1951).
16I will have to make statements about buyer j’s expected payoff from signing or not
signing the contract when entry is uncertain, and this will be complicated if buyer j must
form an expectation over wi.
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I model uncertain entrant marginal cost as a bimodal random variable cE
that equals cE < cI with probability φ < 1 and c¯E > cI with probability
1 − φ. The wholesale price will be competed down to the lower of cI and cE
in the third stage, and the upstream firm with the lower marginal cost will
be assumed to make all sales. Of course, this means that E could pay the
fixed entry cost, find out that cE = c¯E, and not produce anything, so the
assumption that φ is such that E’s expected payoff from entering is positive
will be necessary.17 If so, then buyer j’s expected payoff from rejecting the
exclusive contract is φpifj|S=1 + (1− φ)pij(c¯E, bj(c¯E)).
If the incumbent will not compete over a free buyer, then that buyer cannot
earn pifj|S=1 as defined above. Rather, that buyer will earn pij(w
m
E , bj(w
m
E )) when
E enters and sets its own profit-maximizing price.
Introducing any one of these wrinkles into the model lowers the payoff
of a free buyer, and also eliminates any entry equilibria of the game. Only
exclusionary equilibria remain.
Proposition 4: When either entry or the entrant’s marginal cost are uncer-
tain, or when the incumbent can credibly commit not to compete over a free
buyer, exclusion occurs in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof: When entry is uncertain and I offers a guaranteed price of wj = cI ,
the payment xj necessary to sign buyer j is equal to
ρpifj|S=1+(1−ρ)pij(wm, bj(wm))−pisj|S=2(cI) = (1−ρ)(pij(wm, bj(wm))−pifj|S=1) < 0.
So a buyer would be willing to pay for the guaranteed wholesale price of cI (xj
would be negative). This is not necessarilly the optimal (xj, wj) combination,
but if there is a better one it must leave I with a strictly positive final payoff
17Formally, φ(cI − cE)qj(bj(wj)) > F .
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from exclusion.
When E’s marginal cost is uncertain and I offers a guaranteed price of
wj = cI , the payment xj necessary to sign buyer j is equal to
φpifj|S=1+(1−φ)pij(c¯E, bj(c¯E))−pisj|S=2(cI) = (1−φ)(pij(c¯E, bj(c¯E))−pifj|S=1) < 0.
Once again, a buyer would be willing to pay for the guaranteed wholesale
price of cI . The same argument as above applies and exclusion is guaranteed
in equilibrium.
Finally, when I can commit not to compete over a free buyer and offers a
guaranteed price of wj = cI , the payment xj necessary to sign buyer j is equal
to
pij(w
m
E , bj(w
m
E ))− pisj|S=2(cI) < 0.
Once again, a buyer would be willing to pay for the guaranteed wholesale
price of cI . The same argument as above applies and exclusion is guaranteed
in equilibrium. 
While I have not characterized equilibrium play in each game exactly (I
have not stated explicitly the offers (xj, wj)), I have demonstrated that any
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium must necessarilly be characterized by ex-
clusion. Once again, such exclusion is socially wasteful in every case. The
possibility of exclusive dealing leading to anticompetitive exclusion is not lim-
ited to these extensions. Any modification of the model which decreases the
expected payoff to a free buyer will lead to only exclusionary equilibria.
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2.5 Discussion
The results have a number of interesting implications from a purely theoretical
perspective and regarding how we treat exclusive dealing contracts as a matter
of antitrust policy. The most important is that in the simple entry game
described above, price guarantees ensure that exclusionary equilibria exist.
Moreover, when several realistic wrinkles are introduced into this basic model,
the exclusionary equilibrium is unique.
This result is important because exclusive contracts signed by firms gen-
erally contain agreements over much more than a simple one-time payment x.
They frequently include agreements over price, in addition to other variables
(exclusive territories, quantities, resale-price-maintenance and services to be
provided by the upstream firm). Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that
exclusive contracts are in general potentially exclusionary, meaning that situ-
ations in which we can conclude there definitely is not anticompetitive effect
will be the exception, rather than the rule as was argued by Director and Levi
(1956), Posner (1976) and Bork (1978).
The most interesting results are those generated under the assumption
that buyers compete with each other downstream. Most striking, perhaps, is
that when buyers compete with each other the optimal wholesale price may
be below marginal cost. This phenomenon is due completely to the fact that
buyers may compete over strategies that are substitutes for one another. That
is, in response to a lower input price, a downstream buyer j increases his
competitive strategy aj, increasing his own profits. This increase in aj is met
with a decrease in ai, an action which further increases j
′s profits. When a
decrease in the wholesale/input price brings with it this added benefit, buyers
are willing to pay for a lower input price than their rival (alternatively, they are
willing to pay to not have a higher input price than their rival). The upstream
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incumbent can take advantage of the nature of these strategic interactions
and sign the two downstream buyers to exclusive contracts, charging them an
input price that is lower than the one they would receive if they simply did
not sign the contracts and allowed I and E to compete the price down to cI .
It is not immediately clear how to interpret such a practice, as the agree-
ment to a wholesale price below cost is not “predatory pricing” in the sense
that the term is usually used: there is no static loss, and thus no required
recoupement period in order for the predatory price to be profitable. In this
case the contracted price is exclusionary rather than predatory, although it is
not impossible that the contracts could be used for predatory purposes (i.e.
to exclude a rival that has already entered). But it is the ability to contract
over price in advance of entry that causes the anticompetitive harm.
When buyers compete over strategic substitutes, final consumer surplus will
actually be higher than it would be if the incumbent and the entrant simply
competed for the buyers over price. An antitrust enforcement agency that
maximizes final consumer surplus would prefer to allow the anticompetitive
exclusive contracts despite the fact that they may lower total surplus due to
the exclusion of the more efficient entrant.
When buyers compete over strategic complements and the optimal whole-
sale price is above cost, the incumbent is engaging in limit pricing. This limit
pricing is effective despite the existence of a real cost advantage for the en-
trant (since E enters if there is only one buyer, economies of scale must be very
modest). The entrant, for its part, disciplines incumbent pricing in the spirit
of the contestable markets literature from the 80s. In general, a perceived flaw
in the contestable markets argument was the assumption that a firm could
enter “faster” than another firm could lower its own price. However, when
incumbent firms can contract on price in advance of the entry decision, the
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incumbent is committing exactly to be unable to change price before the entry
decision.
When buyers compete, the sum of incumbent and buyer surplus is less than
it would be if I did not face an entry threat and charged a 2-part tariff yielding
the integrated monopoly surplus. Since duopolists will generally compete “too
aggressively” and charge a price on the elastic portion of the demand curve,
the wholesale price that would maximize the sum of upstream surplus and
downstream surplus must be strictly above marginal cost. However, I cannot
charge this high of a price. If buyers pass at least a fraction of a lower input
price on to final consumers (which they will under the assumption of downward
sloping final demand), final consumer surplus will actually be higher due to
the potential competition of the entrant. It will also be higher than it would
be under vertical integration, assuming no cost savings.
Of course, firms can and do contract over even more than exclusivity and
price. I have abstracted from other potential terms of exclusive contracts in
order to demonstrate the exclusionary potential of price agreements, but it is
important to recognize that increasing the dimensionality of the contracts can
only increase the potential for anticompetitive exclusion. Hopefully the analy-
sis presented here eliminates any doubt about whether or not the competitive
merits of exclusive dealing contracts should be evaluated on a case-by-base
basis by a rule of reason standard. When exclusive contracts also include an
agreement over price, which they frequently do, their exclusionary power may
be very great.
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2.6 Conclusion
Game theoretic literature on the effects of exclusive dealing has generally rec-
ognized at least the potential for entry deterrence. Most authors have argued
against the Chicago school interpretation of such contracts in favor of a rule
of reason standard in evaluating their competitive effects. I show that when
these contracts can include an agreement over price, they are almost definitely
potentially exclusionary. While the existence of such contracts does not imply
that they are being used explicitly for the purpose of exclusion, there appear
to be very few situations in which it would not be possible to use them in this
way.
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2.A Chaper 2 Appendix
In this section, I consider a parameterized, linear model of final demand and
allow the two downstream buyers to alternately compete over prices (strategic
complements) and quantities (strategic substitutes). I assume that down-
stream firms cannot observe the wholesale price offers made to their competi-
tors by upstream firms.18
Let demand be given by a single representative consumer with utility func-
tion U = q1 +q2− q
2
1+q
2
2+2γq1q2
2
. Downstream buyers will maximize surplus over
prices given final demand, or quanties given final inverse demand.
2.A.1 Strategic complements: Bertrand competition
Demand functions (for the Bertrand case) are given by the following piecewise
function:
qj(pj, pi) =

1− pj : pj ≤ −(1−γ)+piγ
1−γ−pj+γpi
(1−γ)(1+γ) :
−(1−γ)+pi
γ
< pj < 1− γ + γpi
0 : pj ≥ 1− γ + γpi
Given the piece-wise nature of this downstream demand function, E may
choose to offer a wholesale price lower than cI to a single free buyer so that
they may monopolize the downstream market. This will occur if the differ-
ence in variable costs is sufficiently large, and if buyers compete particularly
aggressively (γ sufficiently close to 1). For the purposes of this example, I
assume that these conditions are not met, and that E offers wE = cI in stage
3 of the game.
Buyer j’s demand and surplus functions are:
18This is the typical assumption, made by Abito and Wright (2008) for example. Changing
it would not qualitatively affect the results, but would quantitatively affect the difficulty
level of the algebra.
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qj(pj, pi) =
1− γ − pj + γpi
(1− γ)(1 + γ) pij(wj, pj, pi) = (pj − wj)
1− γ − pj + γpi
(1− γ)(1 + γ)
These functions satisfy the assumptions outlined in section 2, leading to a
unique solution to buyer j’s best response function:
bj(pi, wj) =
1− γ + γpi + wj
2
The best response function can be used to verify that (2.3) holds:
(1− γ + γpi − wj)2
4(1− γ)(1 + γ) =
∫ 1−γ+γpi
wj
1− γ + γpi − wj
2(1− γ(1 + γ) dt
Assuming the symmetric solution w1 = w2 = w for simplicity, the incum-
bent’s maximization problem can be written
max
w
2(w−c) 1− w
(1 + γ)(2− γ)−2(
((2− γ − γ2)(1− cI) + γ(w − c))2
(4− γ2)2(1 + γ)(1− γ) −
(1− γ)(1− w)2
(1 + γ)(2− γ)2 )
with corresponding first order and second order conditions:
(−8 + 4γ2 + 2γ3)w + (8− 6γ2 − γ3 + γ4)cI + 2γ2 − γ3 − γ4 = 0
and
−8 + 4γ2 + 2γ3 < 0.
As is expected in the case of strategic complements, the optimal wholesale
price is above cost:
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w∗ = c+
γ2(2− γ − γ2)(1− c)
8− 2γ2(2− γ) .
In particular, observe that at w = cI ,
∏
I = 0. A small change in w yields:
d
∏
I
=
∂pis1|S=2
∂p2
∂p2
∂p1
dp1
dw1
dw1 =
γ2
4(1− γ)(1 + γ)dw1 > 0.
The incumbent can earn a strictly positive payoff and exclude the entrant by
offering a wholesale price that is above cost.
2.A.2 Strategic substitutes: Cournot competition
Inverse demand functions for the Cournot case are given by pj(qj, qi) = 1 −
qj − γqi.
Buyer 1’s demand and surplus functions are:
qj(qj, qi) = qj pij(wj, qj, qi) = (1− qj − γqi − wj)qj
These functions satisfy the assumptions outlined in section 2, leading to a
unique solution to buyer j’s best response function:
bj(qi, wj) =
1− γqi − wj
2
The best response function can be used to verify that (2.3) holds:
(1− γqi − wj)2
4
=
∫ 1−γqi
wj
1− γqi − wj
2
dt
Assuming the symmetric solution w1 = w2 = w for simplicity, the incum-
bent’s maximization problem can be written
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max
w
∏
I
= 2(w − cI)1− w
2 + γ
− 2((2− γ + γw − 2cI)
2
(2− γ)2(2 + γ)2 −
(1− w)2
(2 + γ)2
)
with corresponding first and second order conditions
(−8 + 2γ2 − γ3)w + 8cI − 2γ2 + γ3 = 0
−8 + 2γ2 − γ3 < 0.
As is expected in the case of strategic substitutes, the optimal wholesale
price is below cost:
w∗ = cI − γ
2(2− γ)(1− c)
8− γ2(2− γ)
In particular, observe that at w = cI ,
∏
I = 0. A small change in w yields::
d
∏
I
=
∂pis1|S=2
∂q2
∂q2
∂q1
dq1
dw1
dw1 =
γ2
4
dw1 < 0.
The incumbent can earn a strictly positive payoff and exclude the entrant by
offering a wholesale price that is below cost.
2.B Figures
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Figure 2.1: Buyer j’s surplus or profit is equal to the area under the input
demand curve, holding the competitor’s action ai constant. The choke price
is a function of ai, reflecting the fact that i can potentially shift the demand
curve j faces in the output market, which will naturally shift j’s input demand
as well.
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Figure 2.2: Incumbent profits are concave and maximized at the symmetric
price w1 = w2 = w
m. However, the payment xj is decreasing in the symmetric
wholesale price. I will find it more profitable to guarantee a wholesale price
that is strictly lower than the monopoly price.
Figure 2.3: I will not exclude charging the monopoly price because this would
lead to a negative payoff. I will prefer to guarantee a lower price, equal to w∗,
earning a positive payoff.
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Figure 2.4: When I charges an input price that is strictly above cost,∫ wj
cI
qsj|S=2(bj(t))dt = B + C, while (wj − cI)qsj|S=2(bj(wj)) = B. C is the
familiar deadweight loss triangle that indicates the difference between sur-
plus under the competitive price and surplus under the higher price. When I
charges an input price that is strictly below cost, − ∫ cI
wj
qsj|S=2(bj(t))dt = −B
while (wj − cI)qsj|S=2(bj(wj)) = −(C +B).
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Chapter 3
Geographic Market Definition
in the US Airline Industry
3.1 Introduction
It is surprisingly rare in the airline economics literature to allow for
imperfect substitution between airports. More commonly, airports
within the same metropolitan area are treated as identical or as
completely separate markets. - Peters (2006)
In 1979 Jim Wright, a congressman from Fort Worth, Texas, sponsored an
amendment to the International Air Transportation Act that banned inter-
state travel out of Dallas Love Airport (DAL). Carriers that had previously
offered service out of DAL had signed an agreement to relocate to the newly
constructed Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) in 1974, and were
concerned about competition from Southwest Airlines out of DAL. Southwest
Airlines had not signed and, as the US Supreme Court had ruled in 1973,
was not bound by the agreement signed by the other carriers. The Wright
Amendment banned service on large and mid-size aircraft from DAL to desti-
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nations outside of Texas and its four neighboring states (Arkansas, Louisiana,
New Mexico, and Oklahoma). It would appear that the concerns of the DFW
carriers were well-founded: Southwest did a brisk business, dominating service
to many non-Wright-restricted destinations on the way to becoming, by some
metrics, the largest and most successful domestic airline.1 Flights out of DAL
proved to be good substitutes for flights out of DFW in the eyes of consumers.
Despite a wealth of empirical literature on the US airline industry, almost
no attention has been paid to the degree to which geographically differentiated
air travel products compete with each other. Researchers typically choose be-
tween two competing definitions of a market for airline travel: a city-pair or
an airport-pair.2 Of course, neither definition can be completely correct. To
the degree that air travel products at different locations exist in the same mar-
ket, they must represent imperfect substitutes. The degree of substitutability
will depend both on the physical distance between airports and on the spatial
distribution of potential customers around them. A model that wants to take
substitution patterns between airports seriously, then, must incorporate data
on locations of consumers and products.
A handful of authors has studied issues of geographic competition and air-
port choice. Morrison (2001) provides econometric evidence of $3 Billion in
consumer savings in 1998 due to lower prices on routes with which Southwest
competed adjacently (via geographically close airports).3 However, Goolsbee
and Syverson (2008) find no evidence of such geographically adjacent com-
petition. Authors that have studied the issue of airport choice directly have
1According to the Department of Transportation, Southwest was the domestic leader
with 13.9% of all passenger-miles flown in the year from July 2009 through June 2010.
2Under a city-pair definition, a market is composed of all air travel products with the
same origin and destination cities, so flights out of DAL and DFW would exist in the same
market. Under an airport-pair definition, a market is composed of all air travel products
with the same origin and destination airports, so that flights out of DAL and DFW would
exist in completely separate markets.
3It should be noted that Morrison’s research was undertaken on behalf of Southwest.
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generally used airline passenger survey data collected in 1995 by the Metropoli-
tan Transportation Commission in the San Francisco Bay Area (for example
Basar and Bhat (2004), Hess and Polak (2005, 2006) and Ishii, Jun and Van
Dender (2009)). Their general findings are that commuting time to the air-
port matters to travelers, and that passengers have substantial heterogeneity
in their tastes for flight characteristics such as price and origin airport (for
example business travelers care less about price and more about commuting
time to the airport than do leisure travelers). These studies show that cus-
tomers simultaneously consider flights out of different airports when making
a flight choice, and thus that such flights do compete with one another.
We estimate a differentiated product, discrete choice model of air travel
demand with unobserved consumer heterogeneity, following Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995) (BLP).4 In our model, products are differentiated by geog-
raphy (among other characteristics) and consumers are located around and
among these products according to the population distribution. Estimates re-
veal substitution patterns amont air travel products at different airports. We
apply these estimates to questions of geographic market definition in the air-
line industry, and evaluate the city-pair and airport-pair market definitions in
the context of an antitrust market as defined by the US Department of Justice
(DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), as well as an economic market
in the sense usually used by researchers and industry observers. The method
is easily replicable and widely applicable, and can be used to study questions
of market definition in other industries.
In the next section we discuss the question of market definition and review
the DOJ method for delineating antitrust markets. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 present
4Methodologically, our econometric model is also close to those of Davis (2006), McManus
(2007) and Thomadsen (2005), who also use information about the spatial distribution of
consumers to estimate a travel cost parameter.
50
our econometric model and our data, respectively. Section 3.5 contains results
of the demand estimation which are used to compute counterfactual scenarios
in sections 3.6 and 3.7. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Geographic market definition
How to define a market is a classic question dating back at least to Alfred
Marshall (1920), who described a market as “the whole of any region in which
buyers and sellers are in such free intercourse with one another that the prices
of the same goods tend to equality easily and quickly.” We will follow Scheff-
man and Spiller (1987) by referring to this notion of a market as an “eco-
nomic market.” They further interpret this definition of an economic market
as “that area and set of products within which prices are linked to one an-
other by supply- or demand-side arbitrage and in which those prices can be
treated independently of prices of goods not in the market.” In a differenti-
ated products industry such as the US airline industry, prices will never tend
to equality. So in defining an economic market we should be looking for the
set of products such that a hypothetical firm setting a price for one of those
products would not be worried about competition from any product outside of
that set. Naturally this will be the set of products that consumers find to be
reasonably substitutable for one another. This is the market definition which
comes closest to how economists and industry members generally use the term
“market.”
The DOJ definition of an antitrust market can be found in the Horizon-
tal Merger Guidelines.5 Specifically, a relevant market for merger analysis
is defined as a set of products over which a single firm could exercise mar-
5Technically, the definition can be attributed to both the DOJ and the FTC as they
coauthor the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Throughout the paper, we will use the term
DOJ to mean “antitrust authority”, a term meant to include both the DOJ and the FTC.
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ket power. The test performed by the DOJ in conducting analyses of the
potential competitive effects of mergers is frequently referred to as the “hypo-
thetical monopolist” (HM) test, and involves defining a small set of products
over which the HM is given pricing power. If the HM “likely would impose at
least a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (“SSNIP”) on
at least one product in the market”, then that set of products constitutes the
relevant market. The benchmark SSNIP is 5%, although the Guidelines note
that the DOJ may use an increase of more or less than this amount depending
on “the nature of the industry and the merging firms’ positions in it.”
The process of defining a geographic market using the HM test is then quite
simple; begin with all products at a single location (in our case, all products
at a single airport) and ask whether or not the HM would profitably impose
a SSNIP. If so then the relevant market only includes products at this single
location; if not then include products at the next closest geographic location
and perform the test again.
This test naturally leads to a more narrow definition of a market than
how the term is typically used. Katz and Shapiro (2003) show that the HM
test can lead to very narrowly defined markets, in particular when margins
are high (i.e., when products are very differentiated). While such a market
definition may seem appropriate given that the goal of antitrust analysis is
to identify potential anticompetitive effect, courts have preferred to define a
market more broadly, and more intuitively, as the set of products among which
consumers substitute. For example, Farrell and Shapiro (2008) note that when
Whole Foods proposed to buy Wild Oats in 2007 the FTC argued that the
two grocers competed in a market for natural or organic supermarkets separate
from such grocery chains as Krogers or Safeway. The District Court of Appeals
rejected this market definition, in part because of evidence that Whole Foods
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and Wild Oats customers also shop at other supermarkets.
Our study is not about mergers, except to the extent that our analysis
informs questions of geographic market definition that might occur during
merger analysis. However, the method for delineating a product and geo-
graphic market outlined in the Merger Guidelines represents the only formal
exposition of the topic. Thus, we will apply the HM test to the markets in our
sample, and also analyze substitution patterns among airports when individ-
ual prices of popular products are raised. We find that the relevant geographic
market for merger analysis defined by the HM test is frequently an airport-
pair definition, while the more intuitive definition as the set of products among
which consumers substitute (and thus the definition likely to be preferred by
courts in a merger case) is the city-pair definition. We also conduct merger
simulations using each type of market definition, and find that both defini-
tions underpredict price increases as compared to our model in which different
airports represent imperfect substitutes for one another.
3.3 A model of air travel demand
We employ a discrete choice model of air travel demand in which consumers in
each market are assumed to choose between a menu of air travel products which
can include not purchasing any product at all. Demand parameters from the
estimated model, along with an assumption on firm behavior, are used to infer
marginal costs. These marginal costs are used to estimate pricing behavior
under different counterfactual scenarios.
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3.3.1 Demand
Consumers i = 1, . . .Mt (where Mt is the size of market t), in markets t =
1, . . . T choose between consuming exactly one unit of j = 1, . . . Jt products or
an outside good, the mean utility of which is normalized to zero. Consumer
i’s utility from consuming product j in market t is given by
uijt = xjtβi − αipjt − γd(`it, ljt) + ξjt + ijt. (3.1)
The familiar arguments of the utility function are xjt, a 1×k vector of observed
characteristics of product j, pjt, the observed price of product j, and the
two error terms ξjt and ijt. The former is a product-specific error that is
unobservable to the econometrician but observable to consumers and firms,
and is thus likely to be correlated with the price of product j. The latter is an
individual- and product-specific idiosyncratic error that is assumed to be mean
zero and distributed Type-I extreme value. The remaining argument d(`it, ljt)
is also individual- and product-specific; it is the distance between the location
of consumer i, `it, and the location of product j, ljt. The parameter γ is then a
transport cost, equal to the disutility incurred from traveling both to and from
the airport. The parameters αi and βi also vary by consumer. Individuals share
a mean α and β, and their own idiosyncratic variations around these mean
parameters are explained by their income, for example αi = α + Iipip.
6 These
income interactions are meant to capture heterogeneity in taste for observed
product characteristics.
The set of consumers in market t who choose each product is defined as
Ajt(p, x, ξ) = {`it, Iit, it|uijt ≥ uimt,∀m = 0, 1, . . . Jt}. The market share of
6In the actual estimation we follow the usual procedure and take the log of income
and then use differences to multiply the parameter. So, for individual i, Ii represents the
difference between i’s logged income and the mean logged income level in our sample.
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good j is then
sjt(pt, xt, ξt) =
∫
Ajt
dF (`t, It, t) =
∫
Ajt
dF (`t, It)dF (t) (3.2)
where the last equality follows from the fact that the errors are assumed to be
identically and independently distributed.
3.3.2 Supply
Given the demand model specified above, an assumption on firm conduct is
necessary to identify marginal costs. We follow Peters (2006), Gayle (2007)
and Berry and Jia (2010) in assuming that airlines play a static Bertrand
pricing game.7 The supply side methodology presented below is explained in
more detail by Nevo (2000a) and Peters (2006).
Demand for product j in market t is given by
qjt = sjt(pt, xt, lt, It, ξt)Mt (3.3)
Let f denote a particular airline, and let Ff denote the set of products owned
by airline f . The profits of airline f can then be expressed as
7Peters (2006) conducts merger simulations using this methodology, and then compares
their predictions with ex-post outcomes in markets for air travel. He finds that merger sim-
ulations perform poorly, mostly because of supply-side changes as the result of mergers that
are not accounted for by the typical Bertrand-Nash merger simulation model. Gayle (2007),
on the other hand, estimates marginal costs, then uses them to predict prices using the
Bertand-Nash assumption. He finds the predicted prices to be highly correlated with actual
observed prices in his model. A reasonable interpretation of the apparently incompatible
results is that Bertrand-Nash is a good approximation to how airlines actually compete in
the short run, while in the long-run mergers frequently result in larger supply side changes,
for example in the structure of an airline’s route network. Such changes would lead to the
large divergence between the predicted effects of a merger and the actual competitive effects
of a merger that Peters (2006) documents. Benkard, Bodoh-Creed and Lazarev (2010) es-
timate a dynamic merger simulations model using airline data in order to more accurately
predict the supply side changes documented by Peters (2006).
55
∏
f
=
∑
j∈Ff
(pj −mcj)qj − Cf (3.4)
where mcj and Cf denote the marginal cost of producing product j and the
fixed cost incurred by firm f , respectively.
The standard first order conditions which result from the Bertrand pricing
assumption are used to recover estimates of marginal costs. These marginal
costs can then be fed back into the profit function in order to estimate firm
profits for any combination of market prices. The DOJ HM test involves
changing Ff so that all products at an individual airport are owned by the same
firm. Under a merger, Ff will change as well, and the first order conditions can
be used to solve for post-merger prices under the assumption that marginal
costs do not change as a result of the merger.
3.3.3 Estimation
Using the familiar logit formula for the idiosyncratic error and the population
distribution of individuals in and around markets, the model can be estimated
by matching the market shares predicted by the model to those we observe in
the data as closely as possible. The estimation method closely follows Berry
(1994), BLP, and Nevo (2000b). Specifically, we use simulated demographic
draws in order to numerically approximate the integral in (3.2).8 Drawing ns
simulated individuals from the joint demographic distribution of income and
location, the estimated market share of product j in market t is
sjt(pt, xt, lt, It, ξt) =
1
ns
ns∑
i=1
exjtβi−αipjt−γdijt+ξjt
1 +
∑Jt
m=1 e
xmtβi−αipmt−γdimt+ξmt
. (3.5)
8The demographic draws are necessary in the absence of data matching individuals to
purchases.
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Solving (3.5) for the unobserved product-specific error leaves ξ as an econo-
metric error, expressed as a function of observed and predicted shares, which
can be interacted with a set of exogenous instruments in a Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) estimator. Calculating ξ for given parameter values, how-
ever, is no simple task and must be done by inverting the market share equation
via contraction mapping.9,10
3.3.4 Identification
Nevo (2000b) discusses identification of BLP-style demand models using de-
mographic data, while Berry and Haile (2009) show conditions for fully non-
parametric identification of demand. In short, the income interactions in our
model are theoretically identified by observing choices by individuals in differ-
ent markets with different income distributions.
The parameter γ, on the other hand, would be quite well identified even
with data on only one market, provided that market is observed over several
periods with variations in the choices available at different locations. In the
context of the airline industry, it is also well identified with data on several air
travel markets departing from the same origin region (the same set of origin
airports), as long as there is variation across destinations in the characteristics
of products available at the different origin airports.
9The contraction mapping is necessary because of the individual-specific nature of the
utility function. See Berry (1994) for examples of simpler models in which the inversion can
be done more easily, and BLP for a proof of convergence of the contraction mapping.
10Dube´, Fox and Su (2009) argue that the BLP contraction mapping is unlikely to find
a global minimum when tolerance levels are too loose, and present an alternative method
for estimating random coefficient mixed logit models of demand that outperforms the BLP
method in Monte Carlo simulations. While we plan to estimate the model using their
method, for now we solve this problem by using stringent tolerance levels.
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3.4 Data and sample selection
The main source of data used in this study is the Department of Transporta-
tion’s (DOT) Databank 1B (DB1B), which is a 10% sample of ticketed passen-
gers in a quarter. Observed flight characteristics include, but are not limited
to, the transaction price, the airline that sold the ticket, all airports visited
on an itinerary, whether or not the itinerary was booked as a round trip, the
distance between the origin and the destination airport and the actual dis-
tance flown by the passenger. A second source of air travel data is the Air
Carrier Statistics database, containing air traffic information in the form of
databank T-100, a comprehensive aggregation of non-stop segment data from
all commercial air carriers in the US. These data are used to define prices and
characteristics of air travel products, and to construct instruments for price.
Both of these databanks are publicly available from the Bureau of Transporta-
tion Statistics (BTS).11
Market shares are calculated by assuming the market size Mt is propor-
tional to the geometric mean of the populations of the origin and destination
cities. Data on Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) population are down-
loaded from the U.S. Census Bureau website.12 Origin and destination air-
ports were matched to the appropriate MSA by hand, and these populations
used to define market size.13
The demographic data used to draw simulated consumers are also obtained
from the US Census Bureau. The Census 2000 Summary File 1 contains com-
11As of October, 2010 the data can be accessed easily from http://www.transtats.bts.gov.
12As of October, 2010 the url is http://www.census.gov/popest/metro/CBSA-est2006-
annual.html.
13Nevo (2000b) has a short discussion of how to choose Mt. Airline researchers have
assumed Mt proportional to either origin MSA, or the geometric mean of origin and des-
tination MSA. We estimated our model under both assumptions using different factors of
proportionality, and found that parameter values did not depend on the chosen value of Mt
in any major way. The choice of Mt does, however, affect outside good share, and thus
affects substitution patterns between air travel products and the outside good.
58
prehensive information on population by income for all zip code tabulation
areas (ZCTAs) within the U.S.14 Individuals were drawn from the areas sur-
rounding the origin airports according to the geographic distribution of the
population, and then drawn from income brackets according to the income
distribution within that ZCTA.
3.4.1 Sample selection
Because of the availability of good nationwide demographic data due to the
2000 Census, and in order to avoid the shift in demand that immediately
followed the attacks of September 11th, 2001, we have restricted our sample to
all four quarters of the year 2000.
We also restricted our sample to itineraries for which the consumer’s po-
tential choice set is obvious. For example, it is simple to define the choice
set for a consumer in the Houston, Texas area. That consumer can fly out
of George Bush Intercontinental (IAH) or William P. Hobby (HOU), but will
not drive to Austin or San Antonio, the locations of the other nearest ma-
jor airports. On the other hand, it would be very difficult to define a single
choice set for consumers drawn from the area in and around the New York
City tri-state area, which also contains portions of Connecticut and New Jer-
sey. These consumers have many airport choices, and consumers drawn from
the Connecticut side of the city would have different, although not mutually
exclusive, choice sets from consumers drawn from the New Jersey side. Thus,
our sample includes itineraries originating in the Houston area but not those
originating from airports in and around the New York City tri-state area.
Similarly, there are some destinations which consumers may plausibly be able
14A ZCTA is a statistical entity developed by the U.S. Census Bureau for the purposes
of aggregating data from the 2000 census. ZCTAs correspond to and approximate, but are
not necessarilly the same as, postal zip codes. As of October, 2010, more information on
ZCTAs can be found at http://www.census.gov/geo/ZCTA/zcta.html
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to reach by landing at more than one airport. We do not use routes to such
airports in our sample, due again to concerns about accurately defining the
consumer’s choice set. Table 3.1 presents a list of origin airports used in the
study, while Table 3.2 presents a list of destination airports used in the study.
A more detailed description of how we chose which origin airports to include
in the study is presented in the appendix.
Table 3.1: Origin airports in sample
Origin region Name Code
Colorado Colorado Springs COS
Colorado Denver International DEN
Dallas Dallas-Forth Worth International DFW
Dallas Dallas Love Field DAL
Houston William P. Hobby HOU
Houston George Bush Intercontinental IAH
SE Florida Miami International MIA
SE Florida Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International FLL
SE Florida Palm Beach International PBI
N California San Francisco International SFO
N California Oakland International OAK
N California Norman Y. Mineta San Jose International SJC
N California Sacramento International SMF
In the end, we include flights from 5 multi-airport origin regions. The
destinations included in the sample are, for each origin region, the 10 most
popular destination airports, excluding destinations containing more than one
airport.
At this point, a word about how we are defining a market in our data
is warranted. The careful reader has noticed that the estimation procedure
requires us to define a market, in the sense that we must define the choice set
for each simulated consumer and the market shares that are interacted in the
GMM estimator. However, the question of market definition is central to our
study. The correct definition of a market or choice set is exactly what we are
after. Thus, we define the market very broadly, and then let the data tell us
to what extent products at different locations exist in the same market.
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For the purposes of estimation, we define a market as a unique combination
of origin region, destination airport and quarter. Thus there will be 40 markets
with the same origin region, or the same set of origin airports.
Table 3.2: Destination airports in the sample
Location Name Code
College Park, GA Hartsfield - Jackson Atlanta International ATL
Austin, TX Austin Bergstrom International AUS
Windsor Locks, CT Bradley International BDL
Boston, MA Boston Logan International BOS
Denver, Colorado Denver International DEN
Fort Worth, TX Dallas / Fort Worth International DFW
Detroit, MI Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County DTW
Jacksonville, FL Jacksonville International JAX
Las Vegas, NV Las Vegas McCarran International LAS
Kansas City, MO Kansas City International MCI
Orlando, FL Orlando International MCO
Minneapolis, MN Minneapolis - St. Paul International MSP
Kenner, LA Louis Armstrong New Orleans International MSY
Portland, OR Portland International PDX
Philadelphia, PA Philadelphia International PHL
Phoenix, AZ Phoenix Sky Harbor International PHX
San Diego, CA San Diego International SAN
San Antonio, TX San Antonio International SAT
Seattle, WA Seattle - Tacoma International SEA
Salt Lake City, UT Salt Lake City International SLC
Tulsa, OK Tulsa International TUL
3.4.2 Construction of the data set
We consider only round-trip travel, and thus drop any itinerary in the DB1B
that was not booked as a round-trip. We also drop itineraries involving more
than two intermediate stops, itineraries with fares less than $20 or more than
$9,999, and itineraries with fares deemed not to be credible, according to a
credibility indicator provided in the data by the DOT. An air travel prod-
uct within a market is defined as a unique combination of airline and travel
itinerary.
The treatment of prices in air travel markets is complicated by the fact
that a given airline/itinerary combination may be purchased multiple times
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at multiple prices by different consumers throughout a quarter. We follow
Peters (2006) and Gayle (2007), as well as a host of other airline researchers,
by averaging prices and assigning each product this single, averaged price.15,16
An observation in our data is then a product in a market, a unique com-
bination of airline, travel itinerary and quarter. In addition to price, observed
characteristics of these products include the number of stops in the itinerary,
the number of destinations served by the carrier out of the origin airport, and
the distance between origin and destination airport. Summary statistics for
these variables, as well as product shares, are presented in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Median Mean Std
Share 9.12× 10−5 2.51× 10−3 1.09× 10−2
Price (2000 $100) 3.21 4.21 3.44
Stops 2.00 1.51 0.67
Destinations Served 11.00 17.29 18.28
Flight Distance (1K miles) 2.47 2.86 1.42
In estimating the model we include a set of air carrier, region and quarter
dummy variables. These variables can be thought of as controlling for any
firm-, region- or time- specific portion of ξjt. Also subsumed into each region-
specific constant term will be any regional difference in a fixed travel cost.
15Other authors have simply defined a product to be a unique combination of fare, airline
and itinerary (Berry, Carnall & Spiller, 2006) or placed different products into different fare
“bins” depending on the fare observed in DB1B (so that a $325 ticket and a $328 ticket
would be treated as the same product with the same price, but a $325 ticket and a $500
ticket would be treated as different products with different prices) (Berry & Jia, 2009).
16Much of the variation in prices can be explained by the fare class of the ticket (e.g.
business class or coach), restrictions on the ticket (such as rules governing whether the
ticket may be refunded or the trip rescheduled), the date of purchase or the dates of travel
(prices typically rise steeply less than two weeks before the flight, and trips that span at
least one weekend are typically cheaper than trips that do not). The DB1B does include
data on fare class, but it is generally regarded as unreliable because different carriers classify
fares in different ways (for example, Southwest assigns the same fare class to all tickets).
The DB1B does not include data on ticket restrictions, date of purchase or dates of travel.
While these unobserved variables affect individual prices, we are implicitly assuming that
they do not have a great effect on average prices, as all fare classes, restrictions and dates
of travel are available for any product in any market. In any case, characteristics that are
unobserved in the data make it very important that we take seriously the ξ term in the
utility function, and instrument price effectively in estimation.
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Numbers of sample observations by carrier and region are presented in Table
3.4. Carrier codes used in the DB1B data are also included in Table 3.4, as
we will use them to refer to airlines later in the paper.
We also construct instruments for the potentially endogenous price variable
using the DB1B and T-100 datasets. These instrumental variables are assumed
to be correlated with the price pj an airline charges for a given product j, but
not with the unobservable ξj. Instruments include average prices charged by an
airline on all routes leaving from other origin airports, the number of carriers
serving a route and within a market, the number of own and rival products
on a route and within a market, the number of own and rival products with
the equivalent number of intermediate stops on a route and within a market,
the percent and number of rival routes that are nonstop, and the deviation
of itinerary distance from the average of competing products offered by other
airlines on a route and within a market.
Table 3.4: Products in sample by airline and region
Airline Code Colorado Dallas Florida Houston Norcal Total
American AA 119 138 297 81 535 1,170
Alaska AS 0 0 0 0 83 83
Continental CO 102 86 219 123 134 664
Delta DL 409 271 614 62 408 1,764
Frontier F9 43 22 0 0 30 95
AirTran FL 0 33 60 20 0 113
America West HP 101 33 64 31 424 653
Midway JI 0 0 34 0 2 36
National N7 0 4 4 0 20 28
Vanguard NJ 42 13 0 0 0 55
Spirit NK 0 0 7 0 0 7
Northwest NW 125 52 142 53 152 524
Sun Country SY 0 4 0 0 2 6
Transworld TW 49 29 61 22 63 224
ATA TZ 20 7 24 0 8 59
United UA 372 73 167 33 1,159 1,804
US Airways US 87 59 851 47 126 1,170
Southwest WN 0 204 181 207 826 1,418
Midwest YX 4 1 0 0 3 8
Total 1,473 1,029 2,725 679 3,975 9,881
We then draw ns = 1, 000 individuals from ZCTAs within 80 miles of
63
at least one of the origin airports in a market. We assign each individual an
income bracket according to the population distribution of incomes within that
ZCTA, and assign that individual an income level equal to the midpoint of that
bracket and a location at the centroid of that ZCTA. We use these simulated
individuals to compute the market shares in (5) for different parameter values
in the estimation procedure.
3.5 Results
The parameters from the estimated demand model are presented in Table 3.5
below. Fare, number of intermediate stops on an itinerary and the cost in-
curred traveling to the airport all enter utility negatively as expected. Flight
distance enters utility positively (flights are more attractive relative to the
outside good when the destination is further away). The mean utility param-
eter for the number of destinations an airline serves out of an origin airport
is small and not significantly different from zero. (In a model without income
interactions it is positive and significant.)
The positive interaction between itinerary stops and income level, though
not significantly different from zero, tells us that higher income travelers in-
cur greater disutility from connections, and thus are more likely to purchase
nonstop flights for a given price level than are lower income travelers. This is
consistent with intuition that wealthier travelers are more willing to pay for a
high quality product, and with the idea that business travelers are more likely
to prefer nonstop flights because of a high opportunity cost of their time. The
positive sign on the interaction with price conforms to intuition that wealthier
travelers incur less disutility from price. We have no prior expectation as to
what the sign of the interaction between income and destinations served or
64
flight distance should be.
Table 3.5: Results from Demand Model
Variable Mean Income interaction
Constant -0.2297 -
(1.0763) -
Price -0.7629 0.2334
(0.0950) (0.1497)
Stops -1.3281 -0.2226
(0.4221) (0.2729)
Destinations -0.0285 -0.0670
(0.0295) (0.0136)
Flight distance 0.1412 -0.1214
(0.1551) (0.3074)
Travel cost (γ) -1.4552
(0.3551)
Quarter, region and airline fixed effects were estimated
but are not reported (see appendix for full estimation re-
sults). Standard errors are robust to general forms of het-
eroskedasticity.
At first glance, the travel cost parameter γ seems high, implying that con-
sumers would, on average, be willing to pay almost $100 in order to avoid an
extra 10 miles of commuting to and from an airport. Most likely, this travel
cost is not linear, though attempts to estimate a quadratic cost or a cost which
depends in some way on traffic congestion around an airport have not been
fruitful (any region-specific fixed travel cost has been subsumed into the esti-
mated dummy variables). Perhaps more importantly, γ represents something
of a reduced form travel cost. In 2000, comparing flights online via search
engine was a relatively new phenomenon, and many customers booked travel
directly with airlines or travel agents, which may have made comparative shop-
ping more difficult.17 In any case, γ represents some degree of substitutability
among geographically differentiated products. To the degree that we have
failed to exactly estimate the true parameter(s), we are probably overestimat-
17Berry & Jia (2010) find that between 1999 and 2006, traveler preferences for direct flights
increased, and travelers became more price sensitive. Much of this change can probably be
attributed to the increased ease with which customers can shop around for the best flight.
By the same token, if we were to estimate our model on 2010 data, we would expect the
travel cost to be lower.
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ing travel cost and thus underestimating the degree of substitutabililty among
airports.
In general, the estimated parameters conform to our expectations, based
on both intuition and results reported in other discrete choice studies of air
travel demand. What makes the results interesting is that they can be used to
analyze substitution patterns among air travel products originating at different
airports. With this motivation in mind, a representative own- and cross-price
elasticity matrix is presented in Table 3.6. Elasticities reported are those for
nonstop flights from Southeastern Florida to Atlanta (the most popular des-
tination) in the third quarter of 2000 (substitution towards connecting flights
and the outside good is also represented by the bottom four rows).
Table 3.6: Elasticity matrix for nonstop flights to ATL, SE Florida region, Q3.
FL FLL AA MIA DL FLL UA MIA DL MIA FL MIA DL PBI
FL FLL -1.540 0.027 0.016 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.000
AA MIA 0.003 -1.994 0.015 0.052 0.015 0.008 0.000
DL FLL 0.013 0.105 -2.437 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.000
UA MIA 0.003 0.252 0.007 -2.204 0.015 0.011 0.000
DL MIA 0.003 0.111 0.004 0.023 -1.852 0.012 0.000
FL MIA 0.003 0.074 0.003 0.020 0.014 -1.595 0.000
DL PBI 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.0000 -2.758
Conn MIA 0.003 0.158 0.005 0.025 0.014 0.012 0.000
Conn FLL 0.013 0.104 0.039 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.000
Conn PBI 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.039
Outside 0.004 0.043 0.007 0.008 0.043 0.004 0.002
Each entry is
∂sj
∂pi
pi
sj
, where i indexes column and j indexes row. So, for example,
the second column indicates percent changes in the market shares of all products
when there is a percentage point increase in the price of an AA flight from MIA to
ATL.
The Southeast Florida region contains three airports scattered along the
densely populated Atlantic coastline. The Southernmost is MIA within the
city of Miami, with Fort Lauderdale’s FLL 21 miles to the north. Another
42 miles to the north is PBI in Palm Beach, Florida. For a large number of
consumers MIA and FLL are close substitutes, while for a smaller number of
consumers FLL and PBI are close substitutes (the area between MIA and FLL
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is much more densely populated than that between FLL and PBI).
The substitution patterns revealed by the elasticity matrix suggest that
there is not substantial substitution between PBI and the other two airports
down the coast, while consumers do readily substitute between MIA and FLL.
For example, a one percent increase in the price of a direct flight on American
Airlines out of MIA leads to similar percent increases in the shares of Delta’s
direct flights out of MIA and FLL. This is suggestive of the idea that consumers
find flights out of MIA and FLL to be substitutable, and that a city-pair market
definition in which FLL and MIA are grouped together into one market may
be more correct than an airport-pair definition in which it is assumed that no
consumer simultaneously considers flights out of the two.
3.6 Market Definition
The main purpose of estimating the model of demand is to rigorously define
geographic markets for airline travel. We first turn to the DOJ’s HM test and
conduct a related “critical loss analysis” that is also described in the Merger
Guidelines. We then conduct a related experiment in which we raise the
prices of individual products in representative markets in our sample and ask
where consumers substitute in response. When substitution between similar
products at different airports is stronger than substitution between dissimilar
products at the same airport, we conclude that the two airports exist in the
same economic market. We find that an airport-pair definition of an antitrust
market is usually the correct one, though this conclusion depends critically on
the level of competition at individual airports. On the other hand, we conclude
that a city-pair definition of an economic market is much more appropriate, as
consumers willingly substitute among airports within the same metropolitan
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area.
3.6.1 Antitrust Markets
The HM test for geographic market definition is simple to implement in mar-
kets for airline travel as all products are sold at one of only a few discrete (and
more or less exogenously imposed) locations. For each airport in our sample,
we assign ownership of all products to a single firm, and solve the Bertrand
first-order conditions for the optimal prices, holding prices at other nearby
airports fixed. This is exactly the method outlined in the Merger Guidelines.
Table 3.7: Hypothetical monopolist test
Route Origin
Largest price increase Carriers on route
All products Nonstop Total Nonstop
Colorado to LAS
COS 10.69 % 1.01 % 4 1
DEN 20.26 % 13.13 % 5 3
Colorado to DFW
COS 5.10 % 1.92 % 5 2
DEN 55.42 % 8.03 % 7 4
Colorado to PHX
COS 0.84 % 0.23 % 3 1
DEN 4.59 % 4.59 % 4 3
Dallas to SAT
DAL 0 % 0 % 1 1
DFW 48.85 % 48.85 % 3 2
Dallas to AUS
DAL 0 % 0 % 1 1
DFW 47.94 % 47.94 % 3 2
Dallas to MSY
DAL 0 % 0 % 1 1
DFW 36.79 % 36.79 % 4 2
Houston to MSY
HOU 0 % 0 % 1 1
IAH 1.01 % 0.00 % 2 1
Houston to ATL
HOU 1.80 % 1.11 % 2 2
IAH 16.89 % 2.16 % 7 2
Houston to LAS
HOU 3.18 % 0.06 % 3 1
IAH 5.70 % 2.92 % 7 2
SE Florida to ATL
FLL 3.61 % 0.80 % 4 2
MIA 9.27 % 6.21 % 5 4
PBI 0.53 % -0.03 % 2 1
SE Florida to BOS
FLL 6.41 % 5.22 % 7 4
MIA 16.26 % 1.13 % 7 1
PBI 6.31 % 3.21 % 6 2
SE Florida to LAS
FLL 7.41 % 4.00 % 9 3
MIA 9.66 % 3.04 % 9 2
PBI 3.46 % - % 6 0
N California to LAS
OAK 11.30 % 11.30 % 4 3
SFO 41.34 % 21.61 % 6 5
SJC 28.76 % 27.96 % 4 3
SMF 10.31 % 8.43 % 3 2
N California to SAN
OAK 48.93 % 19.01 % 3 2
SFO 37.19 % 11.78 % 3 2
SJC 38.31 % 19.08 % 4 2
SMF 13.72 % 13.72 % 2 2
N California to SEA
OAK 5.75 % 5.75 % 2 2
SFO 23.83 % 3.19 % 3 2
SJC 26.60 % 19.38 % 5 3
SMF 2.04 % 2.04 % 3 2
Predicted price increases are for the 3rd quarter of 2000.
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We perform the HM test for the three most popular destinations from
each of the five origin regions in our sample. Results are reported in Table
3.7. Because the demand model reveals a substantial preference for nonstop
flights, and because most major routes are characterized by a small number
of airlines offering nonstop service alongside a multitude of less attractive
connecting options, the relevant product market for antitrust analysis usually
consists of only nonstop flights.18 We report both the largest predicted price
increase for all air travel products at an airport, and the largest predicted price
increase for nonstop products. Because there is substantial variation in the
competitive environment at the airports, we also report the number of carriers
active on the route, and the number offering nonstop flights on the route.
Results of the test suggest that for many of the routes in our sample,
an antitrust market would not include competition from another airport, no
matter how geographically close. For example, a hypothetical monopolist at
Oakland or San Jose would profitably impose at least a 5% price increase
on at least one product of each type despite the presence of competition out
of San Francisco only 11 and 30 miles away, respectively, from each airport.
In general, there is sufficient competition at each of the four airports that a
merger of firms at an individual airport would allow for an increased exercise
of market power at that airport despite the presence of geographically adjacent
substitutes.
The three destinations considered from the Dallas region are not nearly as
competitive.19 In each case, Southwest Airlines is the only carrier operating out
of DAL, while American and Delta Airlines offer direct service from their hubs
at DFW. As travel to each destination is a three firm oligopoly, a merger to
18This intuition has been confirmed through conversations with economists at the DOJ
who have worked on airline merger investigations.
19These are the three destinations in our sample to which the Wright Amendment does
not restrict travel from DAL.
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duopoly will naturally result in significant price increases. If the two merging
firms are at the same location, as they are when the HM test is applied to
DFW, then an antitrust market will exclude competition from Southwest just
12 miles away. On the other hand, the HM test is redundant when applied
to DAL as there is already an actual monopolist at that airport. As noted in
the Merger Guidelines, the HM test can only be performed in the presence of
some minimum level of competition.
Results of the HM test in the Dallas region illustrate a somewhat paradox-
ical feature of the DOJ method for market delineation: product A may fall
into product B’s relevant geographic or product market, even if B does not
fall into A’s. In this case, flights out of DAL exist in the same antitrust mar-
ket as those out of DFW, but those out of DFW exist in a separate antitrust
market from those out of DAL. However, as we will see below, substitution
towards Southwest flights out of DAL in the event of price increases at DFW
is substantial. In this case the HM test indicates where we are likely to see
anticompetitive effect, but provides little guidance as to what is the set of
products among which consumers will readily substitute.
In general, the HM test is more indicative of the competitive environment
at each airport than it is of the degree of substitution among them. Estimates
suggest that HOU and IAH exist within the same antitrust market, but this
has as much to do with the fact that routes out of these airports are relatively
concentrated as it does with the proximity of the two airports. In Colorado,
DEN appears to consitute a geographic market, while a HM at COS could
not exercise market power over the price of any nonstop product for the three
destinations we consider due to a lack of nonstop competition on these routes
(DFW is the only destination of the three that is served nonstop by more than
one carrier out of COS). In Southeast Florida, a price increase of at least 5% is
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observed for nonstop flights from MIA to ATL and from FLL to BOS, routes
on which four different carriers compete nonstop, but not on less competitive
routes.
Table 3.8: Critical loss analysis
Route Origin
∆ profits Carriers on route Miles to
if price ↑ Connecting Nonstop nearest airport
Colorado to LAS
COS -0.015 % 4 1 73 (DEN)
DEN -0.026 % 5 3 73 (COS)
Colorado to DFW
COS -0.120 % 5 2 73 (DEN)
DEN -0.588 % 7 4 73 (COS)
Colorado to PHX
COS -0.585 % 3 1 73 (DEN)
DEN -0.968 % 4 3 73 (COS)
Dallas to SAT
DAL -0.247 % 1 1 12 (DFW)
DFW 0.230 % 3 2 12 (DAL)
Dallas to AUS
DAL -0.224 % 1 1 12 (DFW)
DFW 0.763 % 3 2 12 (DAL)
Dallas to MSY
DAL -0.326 % 1 1 12 (DFW)
DFW 0.862 % 4 2 12 (DAL)
Houston to MSY
HOU -0.374 % 1 1 24 (IAH)
IAH -0.111 % 2 1 24 (HOU)
Houston to ATL
HOU -0.179 % 2 2 24 (IAH)
IAH -0.349 % 7 2 24 (HOU)
Houston to LAS
HOU -0.611 % 3 1 24 (IAH)
IAH -0.512 % 7 2 24 (HOU)
SE Florida to ATL
FLL -0.315 % 4 2 21 (MIA)
MIA -0.030 % 5 4 21 (FLL)
PBI -0.827 % 2 1 42 (FLL)
SE Florida to BOS
FLL 0.301 % 7 4 21 (MIA)
MIA -0.303 % 7 1 21 (FLL)
PBI -0.143 % 6 2 42 (FLL)
SE Florida to LAS
FLL 0.440 % 9 3 21 (MIA)
MIA -0.120 % 9 2 21 (FLL)
PBI -0.525 % 6 0 42 (FLL)
No California to LAS
OAK 0.215 % 4 3 11 (SFO)
SFO 0.518 % 6 5 11 (OAK)
SJC 0.873 % 4 3 30 (OAK)
SMF 0.370 % 3 2 75 (OAK)
No California to SAN
OAK -0.567 % 3 2 11 (SFO)
SFO -0.408 % 3 2 11 (OAK)
SJC 0.532 % 4 2 30 (OAK)
SMF 0.154 % 2 2 75 (OAK)
No California to SEA
OAK 0.055 % 2 2 11 (SFO)
SFO -0.112 % 3 2 11 (OAK)
SJC 0.810 % 5 3 30 (OAK)
SMF -0.117 % 3 2 75 (OAK)
Predicted changes in profits are for the 3rd quarter of 2000.
Critical loss analysis, also discussed in the Merger Guidelines, asks “whether
imposing at least a SSNIP on one or more products in a candidate market
would raise or lower the hypothetical monopolist’s profits.” In principle we
should analyze what happens to the HM’s profits when the price of each good
in each market is individually raised 5%, but the sheer number of products
in some markets makes it difficult to report the results, and guarantees that
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in all markets that are at least moderately competitive, there is at least one
such product (usually a very unpopular connecting flight). Thus, we report
in Table 3.8 the change in profits at each airport when prices are raised 5%
across the board.
Results of the critical loss analysis are similar to those obtained from the
HM tests. An across-the-board increase in prices of 5% is generally profitable
when competition at an airport is high and thus prices are significantly below
the monopoly level, for example at the San Francisco Bay Area airports. On
the other hand, such an increase is not profitable when competition at an
airport is low, for example at DAL where Southwest is the only carrier, and
thus already a monopolist at that airport.
While we have followed the DOJ/FTC method for geographic market def-
inition as precisely as possible, it should be noted that relevant antitrust mar-
kets for merger analysis may be defined by these agencies simultaneously along
product and geographic dimensions. Thus, beginning with one air travel prod-
uct at one airport, we could proceed by adding a product at another airport
before adding more products at the same airport. In this way, we could con-
clude that the relevant market includes products at more than one location.
Since the choice of which products to include at what stage of the HM test
is arbitrary, and leads to different results depending on the order in which
the products are added, the results are not particularly useful for identify-
ing a more intuitive definition of a market as a set of products among which
consumers substitute.
3.6.2 Economic Markets
An exercise in which we raise the prices of individual products by 5% and
observe substitution patterns across products at geographically close airports
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provides a different, but more illuminating, perspective on the degree to which
geographically differentiated products compete with one another. Since our
estimates suggest a strong preference for nonstop flights, we analyze substitu-
tion patterns between nonstop and connecting flights at different airports. If
the price of a nonstop flight from airport A is raised and substitution towards
nonstop flights from airport B is stronger than substitution towards connect-
ing flights from airport A, then we believe it is reasonable to consider these
two airports to exist in the same geographic market.
For each origin region in our sample, we conduct this experiment for the
most popular destination from that region. Once again, all results are com-
puted using the third quarter of 2000.
Table 3.9: Substitution patterns when nonstop prices are raised, Colorado to
LAS
UA DEN F9 DEN HP DEN AA COS
DEN nonstop 2.392 % 12.902 % 3.875 % 0.045 %
DEN conn 1.639 % 1.463 % 1.453 % 0.003 %
COS nonstop 0.023 % 0.005 % 0.005 % -
COS conn 0.008 % 0.001 % 0.001 % 2.481 %
Outside 95.939 % 85.630 % 94.666 % 97.471 %
Each column corresponds to a hypothetical increase in
price of that product of 5%. Each entry in that column
represents the percent of the market share lost as a result
of that price increase to each type of product.
Table 3.9 shows what happens when the price of each individual nonstop
flight from Colorado to LAS is raised 5%. As suggested by the DOJ exercises,
flights out of COS and DEN do not appear to compete with each other to any
great degree. Most customers lost when the prices of nonstop flights at either
airport are raised 5% choose flights at the same airport, or the outside option
of not purchasing any product in our sample.
Flights out of DAL and DFW, on the other hand, appear quite substi-
tutable (see Table 3.10). American Airlines and Delta offer more attractive
nonstop options than Southwest, due to brand preferences as well as the air-
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Table 3.10: Substitution patterns when nonstop prices are raised, Dallas to
SAT
Product WN DAL AA DFW DL DFW
DAL nonstop - 1.131 % 0.763 %
DAL conn 0.301 % 0.282 % 0.191 %
DFW nonstop 7.921 % 12.174 % 32.843 %
DFW conn 0.032 % 0.036 % 0.034 %
Outside 91.747 % 86.378 % 66.170 %
Each column corresponds to a hypothetical in-
crease in price of that product of 5%. Each entry
in that column represents the percent of the mar-
ket share lost as a result of that price increase to
each type of product.
lines’ hub status at DFW. As a result, there is more substitution towards these
popular products than there is away from them. In general, a good deal of
substitution is observed among products at the two airports, with far more
substitution going to nonstop flights at different airports than to connecting
flights at the same airport. Similar patterns are observed in the Houston area,
with nonstop flights out of HOU and IAH proving better substitutes for one
another than connecting flights at either airport.
Table 3.11: Substitution patterns when nonstop prices are raised, Houston to
MSY
Product WN HOU CO IAH
HOU nonstop - 4.421 %
HOU conn 0.219 % 0.423 %
IAH nonstop 25.439 % -
IAH conn 0.001 % 0.001 %
Outside 74.341 % 95.155 %
Each column corresponds to a hypothetical in-
crease in price of that product of 5%. Each entry
in that column represents the percent of the mar-
ket share lost as a result of that price increase to
each type of product.
Turning to the more competitive markets in the sample, Table 3.12 presents
patterns of substitution when prices of individual nonstop flights to ATL out
of MIA, FLL and PBI are raised by 5%. For flights out of MIA and FLL, other
nonstop flights out of either airport appear to be more attractive substitutes
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than connecting flights out of either airport.20 Flights out of PBI, however,
appear to be significantly less substitutable.
Table 3.12: Substitution patterns when nonstop prices are raised, Florida to
ATL
Product FL MIA UA MIA DL MIA AA MIA DL FLL FL FLL DL PBI
MIA nonstop 6.132 % 13.132 % 7.890 % 3.678 % 5.197 % 2.144 % 0.074 %
MIA conn 0.088 % 0.087 % 0.087 % 0.118 % 0.022 % 0.022 % 0.000 %
FLL nonstop 0.383 % 0.476 % 0.407 % 0.870 % 0.648 % 0.835 % 0.087 %
FLL conn 0.180 % 0.404 % 0.291 % 0.943 % 2.165 % 1.136 % 0.082 %
PBI nonstop 0.001 % 0.001 % 0.001 % 0.002 % 0.013 % 0.008 % -
PBI conn 0.000 % 0.000 % 0.000 % 0.000 % 0.000 % 0.000 % 0.039 %
Outside 93.145 % 85.901 % 91.323 % 94.389 % 91.954 % 95.856 % 99.717 %
Each column corresponds to a hypothetical increase in price of that product of 5%. Each
entry in that column represents the percent of the market share lost as a result of that
price increase to each type of product.
There are 13 nonstop products offered from the four major airports in
Northern California to LAS, the most popular destination in the sample. Table
3.13 shows substitution patterns when the prices of select nonstop products are
raised by 5%. It is clear that consumers find flights out of OAK and SFO to be
close substitutes for one another. SJC, at the bottom of the San Francisco Bay
Area, is more geographically differentiated, but the policy experiments suggest
substantial substitution towards products at OAK and SFO in response to
price increases. As expected, products located at SMF do not appear to be
particularly close substitutes for any other air travel products in the Northern
California region.
As mentioned in the introduction, researchers have typically defined a mar-
ket as either an airport-pair or a city-pair. Under the airport-pair definition,
flights from all thirteen origin airports in Table 1 to a given destination would
constitute thirteen different markets for air travel. Under a city-pair defini-
tion, flights out of COS and DEN exist in separate markets, while flights out
20Most nonstop products in the sample are offered out of MIA, while most connecting
products in the sample are offered out of FLL. This is why most substitution to nonstop
flights goes to MIA, while most substitution to connecting products goes to FLL.
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Table 3.13: Substitution patterns when nonstop prices are raised, No Califor-
nia to LAS
Product WN OAK AA OAK N7 SFO UA SFO HP SJC AA SJC HP SMF WN SMF
OAK nonstop 8.365 % 5.322 % 7.082 % 4.825 % 1.199 % 1.064 % 0.007 % 0.007 %
OAK conn 6.689 % 6.341 % 3.633 % 4.664 % 0.608 % 0.703 % 0.004 % 0.005 %
SFO nonstop 14.18 % 11.401 % 12.411 % 4.718 % 1.867 % 3.485 % 0.010 % 0.015 %
SFO conn 8.247 % 4.640 % 5.076 % 41.625 % 0.620 % 2.332 % 0.007 % 0.012 %
SJC nonstop 0.899 % 0.972 % 1.003 % 1.350 % 6.989 % 7.307 % 0.001 % 0.001 %
SJC conn 1.273 % 1.083 % 0.984 % 3.445 % 13.709 % 27.278 % 0.001 % 0.002 %
SMF nonstop 0.002 % 0.002 % 0.001 % 0.003 % 0.000 % 0.000 % 1.896 % 3.196 %
SMF conn 0.004 % 0.003 % 0.001 % 0.020 % 0.000 % 0.001 % 7.543 % 9.182 %
Outside 60.340 % 70.237 % 69.810 % 39.360 % 75.007 % 57.832 % 90.531 % 87.581 %
Each column corresponds to a hypothetical increase in price of that product of 5%. Each entry in
that column represents the percent of the market share lost as a result of that price increase to each
type of product.
of DFW and DAL exist in the same market. The policy experiments con-
ducted in this section suggest that the city-pair definition is the more correct
definition of an economic market. Flights out of airports within the same city
are clearly substitutes for one another, while flights out of airports in different
cities do not appear to be.
3.7 Merger Simulations
A merger simulation is a tool used by antitrust practitioners as well as aca-
demic researchers to simulate the potential anticompetitive effects of a merger.
Given a structural model of demand, an assumption on supply-side behavior
yields a set of first-order conditions which can be used to solve for marginal
costs. When two firms in a market merge, these first-order conditions change,
but if marginal costs do not then it is simple to solve the new first-order con-
ditions for the new equilibrium prices. This method can be used to predict
whether any particular merger is likely to lead to substantial price increases,
and thus if serious anticompetitive harm is likely. Nevo (2000a) provides a
more lengthy discussion of the methodology, as do Peters (2006) and Gayle
(2007) in the context of the airline industry.
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As we have mentioned, researchers typically define markets for airline travel
as directional pairs of airports or cities, and in antitrust analysis time con-
straints may inhibit the careful use of demographic location data in a struc-
tural utility model as presented here. We conduct merger simulations using our
sample and compare results to those obtained using city-pair and airport-pair
market definitions.21
In grouping our data into appropriate city-pairs, we follow the lead of
previous authors who have used this definition. In addition to HOU and
IAH in Houston and DAL and DFW in Dallas, we also group the three San
Francisco Bay Area airports (OAK, SFO and SJC) together, as well as MIA
and FLL.22
There is no shortage of major post-2000 airline mergers to study. Ameri-
can bought a distressed Transworld in the Spring of 2001, and America West
bought US Airways in the Spring of 2005, a deal that had been under discus-
sion for several years at that point. More recently, Delta bought Northwest
in the Fall of 2008, the Department of Justice recently approved the purchase
of Continental airlines by United, and Southwest Airlines recently agreed, in
September 2010, to buy Airtran. The results reported below, however, should
not be used to draw wider conclusions about the competitive implications of
these particular mergers. The individual routes we study are not those that
posed the largest competitive concerns at the time of the mergers, and all
except one of the mergers occurred long after the period of our sample.
A useful market in which to conduct merger simulations is the market for
21Demand estimation results using the same sample of data, but alternately using an
airport-pair and city-pair market definition (and not estimating the travel cost parameter
γ) are presented in the appendix. We use these results to conduct merger simulations.
22Berry and Jia (2010) group the Bay Area airports but leave MIA and FLL in different
markets. Boguslaski, Ito and Lee (2004) group MIA and FLL into the same city-pair market,
due to the fact that airlines actively advertise their products out of FLL as competing with
those out of MIA. Given the substantial substitution between these two airports evident in
our model, we also group these two airports into the same city.
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travel from South Florida to Denver in the first quarter. This is a popular
route due to ski/vacation travel, and as a result many carriers offer nonstop
service from at least one of MIA, FLL or PBI. For three of the four mergers
mentioned above, both carriers offered nonstop service to DEN from one of
these three airports.
Table 3.14: Predicted price increases as a result of merger: SE Florida to DEN,
Q1
Merger Product
Predicted price changes
Full model City-pair Airport-pair
AA & TW
AA MIA 0.068 % 0.057 0.003 %
TW FLL 0.550 % 0.799 0.050 %
UA & CO
CO MIA 0.728 % 0.319 % 0.164 %
CO FLL 0.116 % 0.278 % 0.006 %
UA MIA 0.201 % 0.075 % 0.058 %
DL & NW
DL PBI 0.003 % 0.004 % 0.001 %
NW FLL 0.087 % 0.128 % 0.016 %
Taking the predicted price increases from the full model as the “correct”
ones, we see that the city-pair market definition in general outperforms the
airport-pair definition. This is not surprising, as each of these three mergers
involves airlines competing out of different airports. Thus, in every case, an
airport-pair definition completely misses the changed incentives of a merged
firm jointly pricing nonstop flights out of geographically close airports (small
price increases are still observed due to the fact that most major carriers offer
connecting service out of every airport in the sample).23 This is why the
airport-pair definition drastically underpredicts price increases.24
23In the case of the DL-NW merger this is not true: DL only offers nonstop service out
of PBI (and connecting service out of the other two airports). This is why price increases
are so modest.
24The merger simulations also generate predicted price changes on the part of rivals. In
general, these changes were small, and were frequently (just barely) negative. While we
usually think of prices as strategic complements they do not have to be, and Berry and
Pakes (1993) note that “the BLP utility framework is sufficiently rich that prices can be
estimated to be either strategic complements or substitutes.” This is generally possible if
margins are high and if a rival’s price increase makes the demand curve steeper. This may
be encouraging news for airline mergers: if products are sufficiently differentiated firms may
actually respond to a merger by lowering price to gain consumers without a strong brand
preference.
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Table 3.15: Predicted price increases as a result of merger: Northern California
to BOS, Q4
Merger Product
Predicted price changes
Full model City-pair Airport-pair
HP & US
HP SFO 0.635 % 0.148 0.307 %
US SFO 1.388 % 0.412 0.837 %
Turning to the merger between America West and US Airways, we find
a situation in which the airport-pair definition outperforms the city-pair def-
inition. This occurs for two reasons. First, the only market in our data in
which these two airlines both offer nonstop flights is Northern California to
BOS. In this market, five of the seven competing nonstop flights are offered
out of SFO, and none out of OAK. Thus, most of the competition for travel
between Northern California and BOS is occurring on the SFO-BOS route. As
a result, an airport-pair market definition is actually quite close to the correct
one, as SMF is a poor substitute for travelers near the San Francisco Bay
Area and there is no nonstop competition out of OAK. Second, the city-pair
market definition can overstate the amount of competition among products at
different geographic locations. Though we have grouped SJC into the same
city-pair definition as OAK and SFO, in reality SJC and SFO are just over 30
miles apart, and for many consumers are separated by a large body of water.
Thus, the city-pair market definition overestimates the amount of substitution
between SJC and SFO, and thus under predicts the price increase that would
potentially result from a merger of two firms operating out of SFO.
It is interesting that both of the imperfect market definitions that are
usually used to study air travel tend to under-predict price increases. The
city-pair definition overstates the amount of substitution among geographically
differentiated products, while the airport-pair definition misses the incentives
of a merged firm to jointly price products at different geographic locations.25
25We have found that these two market definitions under-predict price increases when
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It is also worth noting the small size of the observed price increases. This
is mostly due to the fact that our sample does not contain the types of routes
that would normally raise competitive concerns for these particular mergers
(for example, hub-hub routes on which the two merging airlines represent most
if not all of the nonstop traffic). Also, since we must compute average prices
for each itinerary in the sample, our model only explains percent changes in
average prices. What happens to the average price as the result of a merger
may not be indicative of what happens to, for example, the 90th percentile
price.
3.8 Conclusion
We have estimated a structural model of demand in order to define as ac-
curately as possible a relevant geographic market for air travel. Our results
suggest that the commonly used “city-pair” market definition is a better rep-
resentation of a true economic market for air travel than the “airport-pair”
definition, and is the appropriate one for economic and industry research. Us-
ing the DOJ HM test, however, we confirm that the relevant definition of an
antitrust market is frequently an airport-pair, as a merger of all firms at a sin-
gle airport will usually result in substantial exercise of market power despite
(and not because of a lack of) the presence of geographically differentiated
competition. Thus, the DOJ test leads to market definitions that seem in-
tuitively narrow, and do not contain all products which can reasonably be
considered substitutes.
While we have applied our model to a specific industry, it is quite general
and can be used to study others. Where detailed data on individual consumers
are unavailable, the spatial distribution of consumers in and around products
compared to the full model estimated with or without the income interactions.
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can be numerically “integrated-out” using the method shown by BLP in order
to estimate a travel-cost utility parameter. This parameter should be well
identified even on multiple observations of the same market over time, in con-
trast to the more commonly estimated demographic interactions. It is our
hope that models similar to this one can be used, along with easily obtainable
population census data, to study questions of geographic market definition in
other industries.
3.A Chapter 3 Appendix
3.A.1 Sample selection
In selecting the sample, our primary goal was to find multi-airport regions in
the continental US where the choice set of a potential traveler would be easy to
define. After identifying candidate regions containing more than one airport,
we investigated the proximity of other airports by drawing concentric circles
around each origin airport and identifying airports falling within these circles.
If another airport existed within 90 miles, then flights from this airport were
either added to the consumer’s choice set, or the region containing this airport
was eliminated from the sample. So, while the Chicago, Los Angeles, Wash-
ington, D.C. and New York City areas are well known multi-airport regions,
defining the choice set for consumers is complicated by the proximity of Mil-
waukee, San Diego, Philadelphia and Newark NJ/Hartford CT, respectively.
We also avoided regions in which much smaller capacity airports (not in the
top 100 in passenger enplanements during the calendar year of 2000) compete
alongside larger airports.
After identifying 5 multi-airport regions that are sufficiently geographi-
cally isolated and contain only “major” airports, we investigated which were
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the most popular destinations from each of those regions. We chose, for each
multi-airport region, the top 10 most traveled-to destination airports, exclud-
ing airports in cities that contain more than one airport. Because many des-
tination airports were in the top 10 from more than one region, we have 21
destination airports in our sample.
3.A.2 Full model
Below are the full results from the demand model, including estimated region,
quarter and airline fixed effects. We did not include dummy variables for small
airlines that did not appear in two or more origin regions in our sample, and
for airlines for which there were less than 100 observations in our sample. The
set of carrier dummies we estimate is the same as those estimated by Berry
and Jia (2010) using 1999 data.
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Table 3.16: Full results from the demand model
Variable Mean Income interaction
Constant -0.2297
(1.0763)
Price -0.7629 0.2334
(0.0950) (0.1497)
Stops -1.3281 -0.2226
(0.4221) (0.2729)
Destinations -0.0285 -0.0670
(0.0295) (0.0136)
Flight Distance 0.1412 -0.1214
(0.1551) (0.3074)
Distance from Airport (γ) -1.4552
(0.3551)
AA (American) 0.5538
(0.1943)
CO (Continental) -0.3953
(0.2182)
DL (Delta) 0.3226
(0.1812)
HP (America West) -0.2750
(0.1909)
NW (Northwest) -0.7827
(0.1682)
TW (Transworld) 0.2649
(0.2247)
UA (United) 0.8393
(0.1990)
US (US Airways) -1.0528
(0.1758)
WN (Southwest) -0.4699
0.2227
Region: Colorado -0.1362
(0.1947)
Region: Dallas -1.2021
(0.2713)
Region: Florida -2.1481
(0.6868)
Region: Houston -1.3522
(0.3255)
Quarter: 1 -0.0855
(0.0898)
Quarter: 2 -0.0748
(0.0826)
Quarter: 3 -0.0245
(0.0809)
3.A.3 Airport pair
Below are the estimated parameters obtained using an airport pair market
definition rather than estimating the parameter γ. For consistency with the full
model, in which we defined markets by origin regions and estimated coefficients
on region dummies, we include dummy variables for each origin airport when
we define markets by origin airport.
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Table 3.17: Results from the airport-pair demand model
Variable Mean Income interaction
Constant -4.9173
(0.3192)
Price -0.8317 0.3050
(0.1655) (0.1985)
Stops -1.3328 -0.3529
(0.3913) (0.7563)
Destinations -0.0000 -0.0540
(0.0437) (0.0224)
Flight Distance 0.1412 -0.1214
(0.1551) (0.3074)
AA (American) 0.1898
(0.1902)
CO (Continental) -0.6246
(0.2282)
DL (Delta) -0.0697
(0.2484)
HP (America West) -0.3330
(0.1828)
NW (Northwest) -0.9867
(0.2286)
TW (Transworld) 0.1436
(0.3008)
UA (United) 0.4743
(0.2300)
US (US Airways) -1.4493
(0.2220)
WN (Southwest) -1.1234
0.2227
SMF 1.2898
(0.2633)
OAK 0.6852
(0.4917)
SJC 1.4700
(0.4222)
SFO 0.8211
(0.4329)
HOU 0.9516
0.1979
IAH 0.2630
(0.2399)
DAL 2.3616
(0.8216)
DFW 0.2753
(0.5375)
DEN 0.9196
(0.4910)
COS 1.8576
(0.4954)
MIA -0.2737
(0.1427)
PBI 0.5357
(0.2088)
Quarter: 1 -0.0375
(0.0746)
Quarter: 2 -0.1331
(0.0950)
Quarter: 3 -0.0595
(0.1008)
3.A.4 City pair
Below are the estimated parameters obtained using a city pair market defi-
nition rather than estimating the parameter γ. For consistency with the full
model, in which we defined markets by origin regions and estimated coefficients
on region dummies, we include dummy variables for each origin city when we
define markets by origin city.
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Table 3.18: Results from the city-pair demand model
Variable Mean Income interaction
Constant -4.2130
(0.5184)
Price -0.7946 0.1078
(0.5484) (0.3347)
Stops -5.2705 3.1112
(0.9231) (0.5303)
Destinations 0.0554 -0.0302
(0.0160) (0.0100)
Flight Distance 0.4232 0.0565
(0.5031) (0.3470)
AA (American) 0.2602
(0.1509)
CO (Continental) -0.6897
(0.1411)
DL (Delta) -0.1754
(0.1126)
HP (America West) -0.2235
(0.1205)
NW (Northwest) -1.1220
(0.1211)
TW (Transworld) -0.0538
(0.1512)
UA (United) 0.3864
(0.1338)
US (US Airways) -1.4114
(0.1198)
WN (Southwest) -0.3634
0.1691
CO Springs 1.0093
0.1637
Dallas -0.4307
(0.1395)
Denver 0.2018
(0.1832)
Miami -0.3188
(0.0.1390)
Houston -0.8191
(0.1686)
Palm Beach -0.5068
0.1273
Quarter: 1 -0.1287
(0.0650)
Quarter: 2 -0.0592
(0.0642)
Quarter: 3 0.0101
(0.0631)
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